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Do not steal. Do not covet anything that belongs to your neighbor. Follow the whole
instruction the Lord your God has commanded you, so that things will go well with you
in the land you are about to possess.
Deuteronomy 5:19,21,33
1 Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in developing countries has been a topic of debate for
many years. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement was
signed as part of the Uruguay Round in 1994. This agreement formally introduced intellectual prop-
erty rights into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the world trading system. The TRIPs
agreement covers copyrights and patents but also enforcement procedures and dispute mechanisms.
Since most developed countries already had such systems in place, the implied changes in national
regulation required by the TRIPs agreement mostly affects developing countries. They have been
forced to increase their IPR protection to remain inside the WTO.
The TRIPs agreement has come in for intense criticism. As Irwin (2009, p.231) explains,
“Many developing countries complain that, unlike mutually beneficial tariff reductions, the TRIPs
agreement merely transfers income from developing to developed countries by strengthening the
ability of multinational corporations to charge higher prices in poorer countries.” In his book
In Defense of Globalization, Bhagwati (2004, p.183) describes TRIPs as “like the introduction of
cancer cells into a healthy body.” For this influential economist, the otherwise healthy body is
the World Trade Organization and TRIPs is killing it. Birdsall, Rodrik and Subramanian (2005)
concur. They write “An international community that presides over TRIPs and similar agreements
forfeits any claim to being development-friendly. This must change: the rich countries cannot just
amend TRIPs; they must abolish it altogether.”
Turning to the economics literature, perhaps the best support for this critique is provided by
McCalman (2001), who estimates the value of transfers of income between countries implied by the
TRIPs agreement. He finds that only a few countries gained from TRIPs (United States, Germany,
France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland) and that all other countries were made worse off, including all
developing countries. But it is just assumed in McCalman’s cost-benefit analysis that there are no
dynamic benefits from TRIPs. Recently, evidence has emerged indicating that there are dynamic
benefits from TRIPs. For example, Branstetter, Fisman, Foley and Saggi (2011) study the response
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of host country industrial production to stronger IPR protection. They find that following patent
reform, US-based multinational firms expand the scale of their activities in reforming countries and
exports of new goods increase in these reforming countries.
The purpose of this paper is to challenge the conventional wisdom that TRIPs is bad for
developing countries. We present a dynamic general equilibrium model that allows us to study
the implications of stronger IPR protection and simultaneous trade liberalization. For developing
countries that belong to the WTO, patent reforms done to satisfy the conditions of the TRIPs
agreement are implemented at the same time as tariffs and other trade barriers are lowered to
comply with other WTO decisions.
In the model, firms in the North (developed countries) engage in innovative R&D to develop
new product varieties, and once successful, these northern firms earn global monopoly profits from
selling the new products. Northern firms also engage in adaptive R&D to learn how to produce
their products in the lower-wage South (developing countries), and once successful, their foreign
affiliates located in the South earn even higher global monopoly profits. Southern firms engage
in imitative R&D to learn how to produce both the product varieties of northern firms and their
foreign affiliates. So over time, the production of every product variety moves from the North to the
South and international technology transfer occurs both through foreign direct investment (FDI)
and imitation. The innovation, FDI and imitation rates are all endogenously determined based on
profit-maximization considerations.
We calibrate the model to fit two benchmark cases: the 1990 benchmark (the world prior
to the implementation of the TRIPs agreement) and the 2005 benchmark (the world after the
implementation of the TRIPs agreement). Going from the 1990 to the 2005 benchmark, we are
able to replicate the large 10-fold observed increase in FDI inflows to developing countries from
1990 to 2005. Our results suggest that for plausible parameter values, TRIPs (stronger southern
IPR protection) leads to more FDI, more innovation and considerably higher long-run southern
consumer welfare. The South also benefits from the trade liberalization that occurred from 1990
to 2005 but the welfare gains from TRIPs are considerably larger. Furthermore, we find that trade
liberalization by itself has a negligible effect in stimulating FDI, so most of the 10-fold observed
increase in FDI inflows to developing countries (from 1990 to 2005) can be attributed to stronger
southern IPR protection. This big increase in FDI is the main reason why TRIPs is good for
developing countries in our analysis.
In the related literature, Helpman (1993), Lai (1998) and Branstetter and Saggi (2011) all
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study the effects of stronger IPR protection using dynamic general equilibrium North-South trade
models with costless FDI. Recently, Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) have developed a dynamic
general equilibrium North-South trade model with costly FDI and we build on their analysis by
also incorporating costly trade. Thus, in our model, there are costs of moving production across
regions and there are also costs of moving goods across regions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and derive
seven steady-state equilibrium conditions. In Section 3, we solve the model numerically for different
parameter values and present the results. Then in Section 4 we offer some concluding remarks.
We discuss the related literature in more detail in Appendix 1 and in Appendix 2, we present
calculations that we did to solve the model in more detail.
2 The Model
2.1 Overview
We consider a global economy consisting of two regions: the North and the South. In both regions,
labor is the only factor used to manufacture product varieties and to do R&D. Labor is perfectly
mobile across activities within a region but cannot move across regions. Since labor markets are
perfectly competitive, there is a single wage rate paid to all northern workers wN and one single wage
rate paid to all southern workers wS . Labor is employed in four distinct activities: manufacturing
of final consumption goods, innovative R&D, adaptive R&D and imitative R&D. Although labor
cannot move across regions, goods can. We assume iceberg trade costs between the North and
the South: τ > 1 units of a good must be produced and exported for one unit to arrive at its
destination.
In this global economy, firms can hire northern workers to engage in innovative R&D with the
goal of learning how to produce new product varieties. A successful firm earns global monopoly
profits from producing a new product variety and selling it to consumers in both regions. We call
such a firm a northern firm because all production is located in the North. A northern firm can
hire southern workers to engage in adaptive R&D with the aim of transferring its manufacturing
operations to the lower-wage South (wN > wS). When successful in adaptive R&D, a firm earns
higher global monopoly profits because of the lower wage rate in the South. We call such a
firm a foreign affiliate because production takes place in the South but a fraction of its profits is
repatriated back to its northern stockholders. Adaptive R&D can be interpreted as an index of
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FDI (foreign direct investment) because it represents the cost that northern firms incur to transfer
their technology to foreign affiliates, and even when financed by southern savings, northern firms
control the amount of adaptive R&D in order to maximize their global expected discounted profits.
In addition, there are southern firms, firms that are owned and operate in the South. These
firms can hire southern workers to engage in imitative R&D with the goal of learning how to
produce foreign affiliate varieties. Once a product variety has been successfully imitated, it is no
longer profitable for the foreign affiliate to produce the variety since the southern firm has lower
production costs. Instead, the successful southern firm produces the imitated variety and earns
global profits from selling to consumers in both regions. Southern firms can also engage in a second
more difficult type of imitative R&D aimed at learning how to produce northern varieties in the
South. When successful, they earn even larger global profits from selling to consumers in both
regions. Thus technology transfer from the North to the South may occur through two different
channels: either through FDI by foreign affiliates or through imitation by southern firms of northern
products.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the model generates one-way product cycles. Each product variety
is initially developed and produced by a northern firm, its production can later shift to a foreign
affiliate as a result of adaptive R&D, and eventually its production shifts to a southern firm that
imitates the production technology. The innovative R&D activities of northern firms result in the
innovation rate g and the adaptive R&D activities of foreign affiliates result in production shifting
to foreign affiliates at the FDI rate φ. Due to the imitative R&D activities of southern firms, foreign
affiliate varieties are imitated at the rate ιS and northern varieties are imitated at the rate ιN . The
innovation, FDI and imitation rates are all endogenously determined based on profit-maximization
considerations.1
2.2 Households
In both the North and the South, there is a fixed measure of households that provide labor services
in exchange for wage payments. Each individual member of a household lives forever and is endowed
with one unit of labor, which is inelastically supplied. The size of each household, measured by
the number of its members, grows exponentially at a fixed rate gL, the population growth rate.
Let LNt = LN0egLt denote the supply of labor in the North at time t, let LSt = LS0egLt denote
1Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011) present a North-South model with exogenous imitation and costless trade.
The reader may find it useful to study this simpler model first, before studying the more complicated model in this
paper.
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Production by Northern Firms
             nN varieties
Production by Foreign Affiliates
           nF varieties
Production by Southern Firms
           nI varieties
Innovation
FDI
Imitation
Production by Southern Firms
           nC varieties
at rate g
at rate ϕ
at rate ιNat rate ιS
Imitation
Figure 1: One-Way Product Cycles.
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the corresponding supply of labor in the South, and let Lt = LNt + LSt denote the world supply
of labor. In addition to wage income, households also receive asset income from their ownership
of firms. We assume that R&D done in the North is financed by northern savings and R&D done
in the South is financed by southern savings, which is consistent with the Feldstein and Horioka
(1980) finding that domestic savings finances domestic investments.
Households in both the North and the South share identical preferences. Each household is
modeled as a dynastic family that maximizes discounted lifetime utility
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−gL)t ln(ut)dt (1)
where ρ > gL is the subjective discount rate and ut is the static utility of an individual at time t.
The static constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function is given by
ut =
[∫ nt
0
xt(ω)αdω
] 1
α
, 0 < α < 1. (2)
In (2), xt (ω) is the per capita quantity demanded of the product variety ω at time t and nt is the
total number of invented varieties at time t. There are four types of varieties: nNt varieties produced
by northern firms, nFt varieties produced by foreign affiliates, nIt varieties produced by southern
firms that have imitated foreign affiliates (“I” for imitation) and nCt varieties produced by southern
firms that have imitated northern firms (“C” for copying). The number for varieties available on the
world market nt is the sum of these four types of varieties: nt = nNt +nFt +nIt +nCt. We assume
that varieties are gross substitutes. Then with α measuring the degree of product differentiation,
the elasticity of substitution between product varieties is σ ≡ 11−α > 1.
Solving the static consumer optimization problem yields the demand function:
xt (ω) =
pt (ω)
−σ ct
P 1−σt
(3)
where ct is individual consumer expenditure at time t, pt (ω) is the price of variety ω at time t and
Pt ≡
[∫ nt
0 pt (ω)
1−σ dω
]1/(1−σ)
is an index of consumer prices. We will shortly define one such price
index for each of the two regions. By substituting the demand function (3) into (2) and using the
definition of the price index Pt, it can be shown that ut = ct/Pt. Then maximizing (1) subject to
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the relevant intertemporal budget constraint yields the intertemporal optimization condition
c˙t
ct
= rt − ρ (4)
implying that individual consumer expenditure grows over time only if the market interest rate rt
exceeds the subjective discount rate ρ.
The representative consumer in each region has different wage income (wN > wS) and hence
different consumer expenditure. Let cN and cS denote the representative consumer’s expenditure
in the North and South, respectively. We treat the southern wage as the numeraire price (wS = 1),
that is, we measure all prices relative to the price of southern labor. Furthermore, we solve the
model for a steady-state equilibrium where wN , wS , cN and cS are all constant over time. Then
c˙t/ct = 0 in (4) and hence rt = ρ. The steady-state market interest rate is thus constant over time
and equal in the two regions.2
Due to the positive trade costs, the prices of goods differ between the two regions. Let pN denote
the price charged to northern consumers by each northern firm, p∗N denote the price charged to
southern consumers by each northern firm, pF denote the price charged to southern consumers by
each foreign affiliate, p∗F denote the price charged to northern consumers by each foreign affiliate, pI
denote the price charged to southern consumers by each southern firm that has imitated a foreign
affiliate variety, p∗I denote the price charged to northern consumers by each southern firm that
has imitated a foreign affiliate variety, pC denote the price charged to southern consumers by each
southern firm that has imitated a northern variety and p∗C denote the price charged to northern
consumers by each southern firm that has imitated a northern variety. In our notation, the asterisk
refers to a firm’s price in its export market, regardless of whether this market is the North or the
South. We solve for a steady-state equilibrium where all of these prices are constant over time.
2.3 Steady-State Dynamics
We will now derive some properties that must hold in any steady-state equilibrium.
Let g ≡ n˙t/nt denote the steady-state growth rate of the number of varieties. From the variety
condition nt = nNt+nFt+nIt+nCt, it follows that the number of varieties produced by each type of
2Our earlier assumption that “R&D done in the North is financed by northern savings and R&D done in the
South is financed by southern savings” implies that there is no international capital mobility. Thus the two regions
typically have different interest rates along the transition path leading to a new steady-state equilibrium. But in a
steady-state equilibrium, the two regions must have the same interest rate because consumers in both regions have
the same subjective discount rate ρ.
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firm must grow at the same rate g, that is, g ≡ n˙t/nt = n˙Nt/nNt = n˙Ft/nFt = n˙It/nIt = n˙Ct/nCt.
Therefore, the variety shares γN ≡ nNt/nt, γF ≡ nFt/nt, γI ≡ nIt/nt, γC ≡ nCt/nt are necessarily
constant over time in any steady-state equilibrium and satisfy γN + γF + γI + γC = 1.
Let φ ≡ (n˙Ft + n˙It) /nNt denote the steady-state FDI rate, which is constant over time in
any steady-state equilibrium since φ ≡ n˙Ft+n˙ItnNt =
n˙Ft
nFt
nFt/nt
nNt/nt
+ n˙ItnIt
nIt/nt
nNt/nt
= g γFγN + g
γI
γN
. The FDI
rate is the rate at which production of varieties shift from the North to the South due to foreign
affiliates engaging in adaptive R&D. It is taken into account in the definition of the FDI rate that
moving production to a foreign affiliate in the South exposes the firm to a positive imitation rate by
southern firms.3 Let ιS ≡ n˙It/nFt denote this imitation rate of foreign affiliate-produced varieties.
ιS is constant over time in any steady-state equilibrium since ιS ≡ n˙ItnFt =
n˙It
nIt
nIt/nt
nFt/nt
= g γIγF . Let
ιN ≡ n˙Ct/nNt be the imitation rate of northern-produced varieties. This imitation rate is also
constant over time in any steady-state equilibrium since ιN ≡ n˙CtnNt =
n˙Ct
nCt
nCt/nt
nNt/nt
= g γCγN .
Taking the time derivative of the variety condition nt = nNt +nFt +nIt +nCt, we can solve for
the northern variety share γN :
γN =
g
g + φ+ ιN
. (5)
From the steady-state expressions for the imitation rates ιS and ιN , and the steady-state expression
for the northern variety share (5), it follows that
γC =
ιN
g + φ+ ιN
. (6)
Substituting (5) and (6) into γN +γF +γI +γC = 1 yields γF +γI = φg+φ+ιN . Using this expression
together with ιS = gγI/γF , we obtain
γI =
(
φ
g + φ+ ιN
)(
ιS
g + ιS
)
and γF =
(
φ
g + φ+ ιN
)(
g
g + ιS
)
. (7)
As expected, the variety share of foreign affiliates depends positively on the FDI rate (φ ↑⇒ γF ↑).
An increase in the imitation rate of foreign affiliate varieties increases the variety share of the
imitating I-firms at the expense of the foreign affiliates (ιS ↑⇒ γI ↑, γF ↓) and similarly, an increase
in the imitation rate of northern varieties increases the variety share of the imitating C-firms at
3To see that the term n˙It should be included in the FDI rate definition, it is helpful to think about a bathtub
with an open drain that is being filled with water from a faucet. The flow of water coming out of the faucet into the
bathtub equals the rate of change in the volume of water in the bathtub plus the flow of water going down the open
drain. Likewise, the flow number of varieties that firms transfer to the South through FDI (n˙Ft + n˙It) equals the
rate of change in the number of varieties produced by foreign affiliates (n˙Ft) plus the flow number of foreign affiliate
varieties that are imitated by southern firms (n˙It).
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the expense of northern firms (ιN ↑⇒ γC ↑, γN ↓).
Because of trade costs, the price of each product variety is different in the two regions and
and we need to define a price index for each region. Let PNt denote the price index for the
North and PSt denote the price index for the South. Given the earlier definition of the price
index Pt ≡
[∫ nt
0 pt (ω)
1−σ dω
]1/(1−σ)
, it follows that the northern price index satisfies P 1−σNt =
nNtp
1−σ
N + nFt (p
∗
F )
1−σ + nIt (p∗I)
1−σ + nCt (p∗C)
1−σ and the southern price index satisfies P 1−σSt =
nNt (p∗N )
1−σ+nFtp1−σF +nItp
1−σ
I +nCtp
1−σ
C . Using the variety shares defined earlier, we can rewrite
these expressions as
P 1−σNt =
[
γNp
1−σ
N + γF (p
∗
F )
1−σ + γI (p∗I)
1−σ + γC (p∗C)
1−σ
]
nt (8)
P 1−σSt =
[
γN (p∗N )
1−σ + γF p1−σF + γIp
1−σ
I + γCp
1−σ
C
]
nt (9)
where the terms in brackets are constant over time. Thus P 1−σNt and P
1−σ
St both grow over time at
the rate g in any steady-state equilibrium.
2.4 Product Markets
The firms producing different product varieties compete in prices and maximize profits. There
is constant returns to scale in production. For each firm operating in the North and for each of
the foreign affiliates located in the South, one unit of labor produces one unit of output. Due
to their lack of familiarity with the southern economic environment, foreign affiliates have higher
production costs than southern firms. For southern firms that have imitated either a foreign affiliate
variety or a northern variety, ζ ∈ (0, 1) units of labor produce one unit of output. Each northern
firm has the marginal cost wN serving the northern market and taking trade costs into account,
the marginal cost τwN serving the southern market. Costs are lower for foreign affiliates: each
foreign affiliate has the marginal cost wS serving the southern market and the marginal cost τwS
serving the northern market. Southern firms have the lowest costs of all: each southern firm has the
marginal cost ζwS serving the southern market and the marginal cost τζwS serving the northern
market.
A northern firm earns the flow of global profits piNt = (pN − wN )xNtLNt + (p∗N − τwN )x∗NtLSt
where xNt is the quantity demanded by the typical northern consumer of the northern firm’s
product and x∗Nt is the quantity demanded by the typical southern consumer of the northern
firm’s product. Given (3), a northern firm faces consumer demands xNt = p−σN cN/P
1−σ
Nt and
10
x∗Nt = (p
∗
N )
−σ cS/P 1−σSt . A northern firm chooses its price in each market to maximize profits. It is
straightforward to verify that the profit-maximizing price in the northern market is the monopoly
price pN = wNα and similarily in the export market, the profit-maximizing price is the monopoly
price p∗N =
τwN
α . Using these prices and some simple algebra, we can reexpress the northern firm’s
global profit flow as
piNt =
[
wN (XN + τX∗N )
(σ − 1) γN
]
Lt
nt
(10)
where XN ≡ p
−σ
N cNLNtnNt
P 1−σNt Lt
and X∗N ≡ (
p∗N)
−σ
cSLStnNt
P 1−σSt Lt
are population-adjusted aggregate demand
terms for northern product varieties in the North and the South, respectively. XN and X∗N are
both constant over time in steady-state equilibrium since prices and consumer expenditure are
constant over time, LNt grows at the same rate gL as the world population Lt, and both P 1−σNt and
P 1−σSt grow at the same rate g as nNt. Hence the bracketed term in (10) is constant over time in
any steady-state equilibrium and the profits earned by a northern firm only changes because Lt/nt
changes over time. Lt/nt is a measure of the size of the market relevant for each northern firm.
Population growth increases the size of the market for firms but variety growth has the opposite
effect because firms have to share consumer demand with more competing firms.
A foreign affiliate earns the flow of global profits piFt = (pF − wS)xFtLSt + (p∗F − τwS)x∗FtLNt
where xFt = p−σF cS/P
1−σ
St is the quantity demanded by the typical southern consumer of the
foreign affiliate’s product and x∗Ft = (p
∗
F )
−σ cN/P 1−σNt is the quantity demanded by the typical
northern consumer of the foreign affiliate’s product. Profit maximization yields the domestic price
pF = wS/α and the export price p∗F = τwS/α. We assume that τ < wN/wS to ensure that each
foreign affiliate exports to the northern market. For large trade costs, a large wage differential is
needed to justify exporting. Trade costs cannot be too high. The flow of global profits for a foreign
affiliate is
piFt =
[
wS (XF + τX∗F )
(σ − 1) γF
]
Lt
nt
(11)
where XF ≡ p
−σ
F cSLStnFt
P 1−σSt Lt
and X∗F ≡ (
p∗F )
−σ
cNLNtnFt
P 1−σNt Lt
are population-adjusted aggregate demand
terms for foreign affiliate products in the South and the North, respectively. Following the same
reasoning as for aggregate demand for northern products, it can be seen that XF and X∗F are
constant over time in any steady-state equilibrium. Therefore the profit flow of a foreign affiliate
only changes because the market size term Lt/nt changes over time.
After a product variety that a foreign affiliate produces is imitated by a southern firm (an I-
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firm), the southern firm earns the flow of global profits piIt = (pI − ζwS)xItLSt+(p∗I − τζwS)x∗ItLNt
where xIt = p−σI cS/P
1−σ
St is the quantity demanded by the typical southern consumer of the I-firm’s
product and x∗It = (p
∗
I)
−σ cN/P 1−σNt is the quantity demanded by the typical northern consumer
of the I-firm’s product. Without competition, an I-firm would set the monopoly price ζwS/α in
the southern market. But an I-firm is in competition with the foreign affiliate whose product it
has imitated. Given that the foreign affiliate cannot lower its price below its marginal cost wS , we
assume that ζ > α, so ζwS/α exceeds the marginal cost of the foreign affiliate wS . Then the limit
price pI = wS is less than the monopoly price and it is profit-maximizing for the I-firm to practice
limit-pricing in its domestic market. By setting pI = wS , the I-firm gets all the consumers and
drives the foreign affiliate out of business. In the export market, it is also profit-maximizing for the
I-firm to practice limit-pricing by setting p∗I = τwS . With these prices, the global profit flow of a
southern firm that has imitated a foreign affiliate’s product can be expressed as
piIt =
[
wS (1− ζ) (XI +X∗I )
γI
]
Lt
nt
(12)
where XI ≡ p
−σ
I cSLStnIt
P 1−σSt Lt
and X∗I ≡ (
p∗I)
−σ
cNLNtnIt
P 1−σNt Lt
are population-adjusted aggregate demand terms
for the I-firm varieties in the South and the North, respectively. Note that the profits of an I-firm
only change over time because of the market size term Lt/nt.
After a variety that a northern firm produces is imitated by a southern firm (a C-firm), the
southern firm earns the flow of global profits piCt = (pC − ζwS)xCtLSt + (p∗C − τζwS)x∗CtLNt where
xCt = p−σC cS/P
1−σ
St is the quantity demanded by the typical southern consumer of the C-firm’s
product and x∗Ct = (p
∗
C)
−σ cN/P 1−σNt is the quantity demanded by the typical northern consumer of
the C-firm’s product. Maximizing these profits with respect to pC yields the monopoly price ζwS/α.
But the southern firm faces a competitor in the northern firm whose product it has imitated. We
restrict attention to the case where τwN > ζwS/α or equivalently τwN/wS > ζ/α to guarantee
that the southern firm charges the monopoly price pC = ζwS/α in its domestic market. When it
comes to the C-firm’s export market, there are two cases to consider, depending on whether trade
costs are small or large. If wN ≥ τζwS/α or wN/wS ≥ τζ/α (the small trade cost case), then the
northern firm has too high marginal cost wN to effectively compete in the northern market and the
southern firm sets the monopoly export price p∗C = τζwS/α. If wN < τζwS/α or wN/wS < τζ/α
(the large trade cost case), then the northern firm has low enough marginal cost wN so its presence
needs to be taken into account and the southern firm sets the limit price p∗C = wN in equilibrium.
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With these prices, the global profit flow of a southern firm that has imitated a northern firm’s
product can be expressed as
piCt =
[
ζwS (XC + τX∗C)
(σ − 1) γC
]
Lt
nt
if
wN
wS
≥ τζ
α
(13)
piCt =
[
ζwSXC
(σ − 1) γC +
(wN − τζwS)X∗C
γC
]
Lt
nt
if
wN
wS
<
τζ
α
(14)
where XC ≡ p
−σ
C cSLStnCt
P 1−σSt Lt
and X∗C ≡ (
p∗C)
−σ
cNLNtnCt
P 1−σNt Lt
. Again, profits only change if the market size
term Lt/nt changes over time.
The above analysis implies that as a product shifts from being produced by a northern firm to
its foreign affiliate and then by a southern firm, the equilibrium price of the product declines in
the North (pN = wN/α > p∗F = τwS/α > p
∗
I = τwS) as well as in the South (p
∗
N = τwN/α > pF =
wS/α > pI = wS). This price pattern is consistent with Vernon’s (1966) description of the product
life cycle, in which multinational firms play a central role.
2.5 Innovation, FDI and Imitation
There is free entry into innovative R&D activities in the North, with every northern firm having
access to the same R&D technology. To innovate and develop a new product variety, a representative
northern firm i must devote aNgβ/nθt units of labor to innovative R&D, where aN is an innovative
R&D productivity parameter and nt is the disembodied stock of knowledge at time t (the total
number of varieties that have been developed in the past). The intertemporal knowledge spillover
parameter θ can be positive or negative. For θ > 0, R&D labor becomes more productive as time
passes and a northern firm needs to devote less labor to develop a new variety as the stock of
knowledge increases. In contrast, innovating becomes more difficult at time passes when θ < 0.
Grossman and Helpman (1991) assume that intertemporal knowledge spillovers are quite strong and
set θ = 1. We will instead follow Jones (1995) by assuming that intertemporal knowledge spillovers
are weaker and satisfy θ < 1. This assumption is the key to ruling out strong scale effects. Finally,
the externality parameter β > 0 captures the duplicative nature of innovative R&D. When all firms
do more innovative R&D (g ≡ n˙t/nt is higher), β > 0 means that the individual firm must do more
innovative R&D in order to develop a new product variety.
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Given this technology, the flow of new products developed by northern firm i is
n˙it =
lRit
aNgβ/nθt
=
nθt lRit
aNgβ
where n˙it is the time derivative of nit and lRit is the labor used for innovative R&D by firm i (“R”
for R&D). Summing over individual northern firms, the aggregate flow of new products developed
in the North is
n˙t =
nθtLRt
aNgβ
=
[
nθ+βt LRt
aN
]1/(1+β)
(15)
where LRt ≡
∑
i lRit is the total amount of northern labor employed in innovative activities. Thus,
the parameter β measures the degree of decreasing returns to innovative R&D at the industry level.
A large empirical literature on patents and R&D has shown that R&D is subject to significant
decreasing returns at the industry level (point estimates of 1/(1 + β) lie between 0.1 and 0.6
according to Kortum (1993), which corresponds to β values between .66 and 9).
In any steady-state equilibrium, the share of labor employed in innovative R&D must be con-
stant over time. Given that the northern supply of labor grows at the population growth rate gL,
northern R&D employment LRt must grow at this rate as well. Dividing both sides of n˙t =
nθtLRt
aNgβ
by nt yields
g ≡ n˙t
nt
=
nθ−1t LRt
aNgβ
.
Since g is constant over time in any steady-state equilibrium, nθ−1t and LRt must grow at offsetting
rates, that is, (θ − 1) n˙tnt +
L˙Rt
LRt
= (θ − 1) g + gL = 0. It immediately follows that
g ≡ n˙t
nt
=
gL
1− θ . (16)
Thus, the steady-state rate of innovation g is pinned down by parameter values and is proportional
to the population growth rate gL. As in Jones (1995), the parameter restriction θ < 1 is needed to
guarantee that the steady-state rate of innovation is positive and finite (given that there is positive
population growth).
We can now solve for the steady-state rate of economic growth. The representative northern
consumer has utility uNt = cN/PNt and the representative southern consumer has utility uSt =
cS/PSt. In steady-state equilibrium, individual consumer expenditure is constant over time but
consumer utility nevertheless grows because the price indexes fall over time. Since both P 1−σNt and
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P 1−σSt both grow over time at the rate g, it follows that consumer utility growth is
gu ≡ u˙Nt
uNt
=
u˙St
uSt
=
g
σ − 1 =
gL
(1− θ)(σ − 1) . (17)
With consumer utility in both regions being proportional to consumer expenditure holding prices
fixed, consumer utility growth equals real wage growth and we use it as our measure of economic
growth.
Equation (17) implies that public policy changes like trade liberalization (a decrease in τ) have
no effect on the steady-state rate of economic growth. In this model, growth is “semi-endogenous.”
We view this as a virtue of the model because both total factor productivity and per capita GDP
growth rates have been remarkably stable over time in spite of many public policy changes that one
might think would be growth-promoting. For example, plotting data on per capita GDP (in logs)
for the US from 1870 to 1995, Jones (2005, Table 1) shows that a simple linear trend fits the data
extremely well. Further evidence for equation (17) is provided by Venturini (2010). Looking at
US manufacturing industry data for the period 1973-1996, he finds that semi-endogenous growth
models (where public policies do not have long-run growth effects) have better empirical support
than fully-endogenous growth models (where public policies have long-run growth effects).
We can now define relative R&D difficulty. In the unit labor requirement for innovation
aNg
β/nθt , the term n
−θ
t is a measure of (absolute) R&D difficulty. It increases over time if θ < 0
and decreases over time if θ ∈ (0, 1). By taking the ratio of R&D difficulty and the market size
term Lt/nt, we obtain a measure of relative R&D difficulty (or R&D difficulty relative to the size
of the market).
δ ≡ n
−θ
t
Lt/nt
=
n1−θt
Lt
(18)
To see that δ is constant over time in steady-state equilibrium, note that δ˙δ = (1− θ) n˙tnt − L˙tLt =
(1− θ) gL1−θ − gL = 0.
To learn how to produce a northern variety in the South, the foreign affiliate of a northern firm
must devote aFφβ/nθt units of labor to adaptive R&D, where aF is an adaptive R&D productivity
parameter that can be throught of as measuring the friendliness of southern FDI-related policies
and φ ≡ (n˙Ft + n˙It) /nNt is the FDI rate, the rate at which northern varieties shift to the South as
a result of adaptive R&D done by foreign affiliates. The externality parameter β now captures the
duplicative nature of adaptive R&D. Taking into account that adaptation is followed by imitation,
the number of varieties that have been succesfully adapted for southern production by firm i
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increases over time according to
n˙Fit + n˙Iit =
lFit
aFφβ/nθt
=
nθt lFit
aFφβ
where n˙Fit + n˙Iit is the time derivative of the number of varieties that firm i is responsible for
moving to the South and lFit is the labor used for adaptive R&D by firm i (“F” for FDI). Summing
over individual foreign affiliates, the aggregate flow of varieties to the South through FDI is given
by
n˙Ft + n˙It =
nθtLFt
aFφβ
(19)
where LFt =
∑
i lFit is the total amount of southern labor employed in adaptive R&D activities.
To learn how to produce a foreign affiliate variety, a southern firm must devote aIι
β
S/n
θ
t units
of labor to imitative R&D, where aI is an imitative R&D productivity parameter, ιS ≡ n˙It/nFt is
the rate at which a southern firm imitates a foreign affiliate variety and the externality parameter
β > 0 captures the duplicative nature of imitative R&D. When all southern firms do more imitative
R&D (the imitation rate ιS is higher), β > 0 means that individual southern firms must do more
imitative R&D to learn how to produce a foreign affiliate variety. We interpret aI as measuring the
strength of IPR protection in the South and study what happens when aI changes. An increase
in aI means stronger IPR protection in the South (as in compliance with the regulations of the
TRIPs agreement). Given this technology, the flow of foreign affiliate varieties that a southern firm
i imitates is
n˙Iit =
lIit
aIι
β
S/n
θ
t
=
nθt lIit
aIι
β
S
where lIit is the labor used for imitative R&D by firm i. Summing over individual southern firms,
the aggregate flow of foreign affiliate varieties that southern firms imitate is
n˙It =
nθtLIt
aIι
β
S
(20)
where LIt ≡
∑
i lIit is the total amount of southern labor employed in imitating foreign affiliate
varieties.
To learn how to produce a northern variety in the South, a southern firm must devote daIι
β
N/n
θ
t
units of labor to imitative R&D, where d > 1 is a “distance” parameter that captures the extra
cost of imitating northern-produced varieties and ιN ≡ n˙Ct/nNt is the rate at which southern firms
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imitate northern-produced varieties. Given this technology, the flow of northern varieties that
southern firm i imitates is
n˙Cit =
lCit
daIι
β
N/n
θ
t
=
nθt lCit
daIι
β
N
where lCit is the labor used by firm i to imitate northern varieties. Summing over individual
southern firms, the aggregate flow of northern varieties that southern firms imitate is
n˙Ct =
nθtLCt
daIι
β
N
(21)
where LCt ≡
∑
i lCit is the total amount of southern labor employed in imitating northern varieties.
While southern firms can do imitative R&D, we assume that southern firms are not capable of
doing innovative R&D. The conclusions reached in this paper in support of the TRIPs agreement
become even stronger if southern firms can do innovative R&D, because then there is an additional
benefit of TRIPs: more innovation by southern firms.
2.6 R&D Incentives
Let vNt denote the expected discounted profits associated with innovating in the North at time t.
The R&D labor used to develop one new variety is aNgβ/nθt and the cost of developing this variety
is wNaNgβ/nθt . Since there is free entry into innovative R&D activities in the North, the cost of
innovating must be exactly balanced by the benefit of innovating in equilibrium:
vNt =
wNaNg
β
nθt
. (22)
Let vFt denote the expected discounted profits that a foreign affiliate earns from producing a
variety in the South at time t. The foreign affiliate uses aFφβ/nθt units of adaptive R&D labor to
transfer production of one variety to the South and the cost of this transfer is wSaFφβ/nθt . The
benefit of the transfer is not the expected discounted profits that a firm could earn from moving its
production to the South vFt but the gain in expected discounted profits vFt − vNt, since the firm
is already earning profits from producing in the North. Since the cost of technology transfer must
be exactly balanced by the benefit in steady-state equilibrium, we obtain
vFt − vNt = wSaFφ
β
nθt
. (23)
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When techology transfer occurs, each foreign affiliate pays its parent firm the royalty payment vNt
for the use of its technology in the South, since the adaptive R&D accounts for the increment in
the firm’s value vFt − vNt which is less than the foreign affiliate’s market value vFt.
Let vIt denote the expected discounted profits from producing a foreign affiliate-imitated variety.
To learn how to produce a foreign affiliate variety, a southern firm devotes aIι
β
S/n
θ
t units of labor
to imitative R&D and incurs the cost wSaIι
β
S/n
θ
t . Since the benefit of imitating a foreign affiliate
variety equals the cost in steady-state equilibrium, we obtain
vIt =
wSaIι
β
S
nθt
. (24)
Finally, let vCt denote the expected discounted profits from producing a northern-imitated
variety in the South. A southern firm devotes daIι
β
N/n
θ
t units of labor to imitative R&D to learn
how to produce a northern variety in the South and incurs the cost wSdaIι
β
N/n
θ
t . Since the benefit
of imitating a northern variety must equal the cost in steady-state equilibrium, we obtain
vCt =
wSdaIι
β
N
nθt
. (25)
We assume that there is a stock market that channels household savings to firms that engage
in R&D in each region and helps households to diversify the risk of holding stocks issued by these
firms. Since there is no aggregate risk in each region, it is possible for households to earn a safe
return by holding the market portfolio in each region. Hence, ruling out any arbitrage opportunities
implies that the total return on equity claims must equal the opportunity cost of invested capital,
which is given by the risk-free market interest rate ρ.
For a northern firm i, the relevant no-arbitrage condition is
(piNt − wSlFit) dt+ v˙Ntdt+ (n˙Fit + n˙Iit) dt (vFt − vNt)− (ιNdt)vNt = ρvNtdt.
The northern firm earns the profit flow piNt during the time interval dt but also incurs the adaptive
R&D expenditure flow wSlFitdt during this time interval. In addition, the firm experiences the grad-
ual capital gain v˙Ntdt during the time interval dt and its market value jumps up by (vFt − vNt) for
each product that it succeeds in moving to the South. The firm succeeds in moving (n˙Fit + n˙Iit) dt
products to the South during the time interval dt. With the probability ιNdt the firm’s product is
successfully imitated by a southern firm during the time interval dt, in which case the northern firm
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is driven out of business and experiences a total capital loss. To rule out arbitrage opportunities
for investors, the rate of return for the northern firm must be the same as the return on an equal
sized investment in a risk free bond ρvNtdt. Now
(n˙Fit + n˙Iit) (vFt − vNt) = n
θ
t lFit
aFφβ
wSaFφ
β
nθt
= wSlFit
and vNt = wNaNgβ/nθt implies that
v˙Nt
vNt
= −θ n˙tnt = −θg. Thus, after dividing by vNtdt, the no-
arbitrage condition simplifies to piNtvNt − θg − ιN = ρ or vNt =
piNt
ρ+θg+ιN
. Combining this equation
with (22), the northern no-arbitrage condition can be written as
piNt
ρ+ θg + ιN
=
wNaNg
β
nθt
.
In this equation, the left-hand-side is the expected discounted profits from innovating and the right-
hand-side is the cost of innovating. The northern firm’s expected discounted profits or market value
is equal to its current profit flow piNt appropriately discounted by the market interest rate ρ, the
capital loss term θg (capital gain if θ is negative) and the imitation rate ιN . Substituting for piNt
using (10), dividing both sides by wN and then by the market size term Lt/nt yields the steady
state northern no-arbitrage condition
XN+τX
∗
N
(σ−1)γN
ρ+ θg + ιN
= aNδgβ. (26)
The left-hand-side of (26) is the market size-adjusted benefit from innovating and the right-hand-
side is the market size-adjusted cost of innovating. In steady-state calculations, we need to adjust
for market size Lt/nt because market size changes over time if gL 6= g or θ 6= 0. The market size-
adjusted benefit from innovating is higher when the average consumer buys more of each northern
variety (XN + τX∗N ↑), future profits are less heavily discounted (ρ ↓), northern firms experience
larger capital gains over time (θg ↓) and northern firms are exposed to a lower imitation rate (ιN ↓).
The market size-adjusted cost of innovating is higher when northern researchers are less productive
(aN ↑) and innovating is relatively more difficult (δ ↑).
For a foreign affiliate, the relevant no-arbitrage condition is piFtdt+ v˙Ftdt− (ιSdt) vFt = ρvFtdt.
The foreign affiliate earns the profit flow piFt and experiences the gradual capital gain v˙Ftdt during
the time interval dt. However, it is exposed to a positive rate of imitation by southern firms and
experiences a total capital loss if imitated, which occurs with probability ιSdt during the time
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interval dt. The earlier equation vFt − vNt = wSaFφβnθt implies that
v˙Nt
vNt
= v˙FtvFt = −θg, so dividing
the no-arbitrage condition by vFtdt yields piFtvFt − θg − ιS = ρ or vFt =
piFt
ρ+θg+ιS
. Combining this
equation with (22) and (23), we obtain
υFt − υNt = piFt
ρ+ θg + ιS
− wNaNg
β
nθt
=
wSaFφ
β
nθt
where the left-hand-side is the increase in expected discounted profits from moving production to
the South and the right-hand-side is the adaptive R&D cost. The expected discounted profits or
market value of the foreign affiliate is equal to its current profit flow piFt appropriately discounted
by the market interest rate ρ, the capital loss term θg and the imitation rate ιS . Substituting for
piFt using (11), dividing both sides by wS and then by the market size term Lt/nt yields the steady
state foreign affiliate no-arbitrage condition
XF+τX
∗
F
(σ−1)γF
ρ+ θg + ιS
− waNδgβ = aF δφβ (27)
where w ≡ wN/wS is the northern relative wage or the North-South wage ratio. The left-hand-side
of (27) is the market size-adjusted benefit from southern adaptation and the right-hand-side is
the market size-adjusted cost of southern adaptation. The market size-adjusted benefit is higher
when the average consumer buys more of each foreign affiliate variety (XF + τX∗F ↑), future profits
are less heavily discounted (ρ ↓), foreign affiliates experience larger capital gains over time (θg ↓)
and foreign affiliates are exposed to a lower imitation rate (ιS ↓). The market size-adjusted cost
is higher when foreign affiliate researchers are less productive (aF ↑) and adaptation is relatively
more difficult (δ ↑).
For a southern firm imitating a foreign affiliate variety, the relevant no-arbitrage condition is
piItdt+ v˙Itdt = ρvItdt. The southern firm earns the profit flow piIt and also experiences the gradual
capital gain v˙Itdt during the time interval dt. The rate of return for an I-firm must equal the
rate of return on an equal sized investment in a riskfree bond ρvItdt in order to rule out arbitrage
opportunities for investors. Recall that vIt = wSaIι
β
S/n
θ
t , which implies that
v˙It
vIt
= −θg. Dividing
the no-arbitrage condition by vItdt yields piItvIt − θg = ρ and then solving for vIt yields vIt =
piIt
ρ+θg .
Combining this equation with (24), we obtain
piIt
ρ+ θg
=
wSaIι
β
S
nθt
.
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Substituting for piIt using (12), dividing both sides by wS and then by the market size term Lt/nt
yields the steady state no-arbitrage condition for I-firms
(1−ζ)(XI+τX∗I )
γI
ρ+ θg
= aIδι
β
S . (28)
For a southern firm that imitates a northern variety, the relevant no-arbitrage condition is
piCtdt + v˙Ctdt = ρvCtdt. During the time interval dt, the C-firm earns the profit flow piCt and
experiences the gradual capital gain v˙Ctdt. As for the other types of firms, the rate of return for
the C-firm must be the same as the return on an equal-sized investment in a riskfree bond. Recall
that vCt = wSdaIι
β
N/n
θ
t , which implies that
v˙Ct
vCt
= −θg. Dividing the no-arbitrage condition by
vCtdt yields piCtvCt − θg = ρ and then solving for vCt yields
piCt
ρ+ θg
=
wSdaIι
β
N
nθt
.
The southern firm imitating a northern variety will base its pricing decision in the export market
on the size of trade costs and hence there will be one steady-state no-arbitrage condition for each
of the two trade cost cases described earlier. In the small trade cost case, the southern firm can set
the monopoly price in the northern market without having to fear competition from the northern
firm whose variety it has imitated. In the large trade cost case, the southern firm needs to take
competition from the northern firm into account and practice limit pricing in its export market.
Substituting for piCt using (13) and (14), dividing both sides by wS and then by the market size
term Lt/nt yields the steady state C-firm no-arbitrage condition:
ζ(XC+τX∗C)
(σ−1)γC
ρ+ θg
= daIδι
β
N if
wN
wS
≥ τζ
α
ζXC
(σ−1)γC +
(w−τζ)X∗C
γC
ρ+ θg
= daIδι
β
N if
wN
wS
<
τζ
α
. (29)
2.7 Labor Markets
Labor markets is perfecty competitive and wages adjust instantaneously to equate labor demand
and labor supply. In the North, labor is employed in either innovative R&D or in production. Each
innovation requires aNgβ/nθt units of labor, so total employment of labor in innovative R&D is(
aNg
β/nθt
)
n˙t = aN
n1−θt
Lt
gβ n˙tntLt = aNδg
1+βLt. Northern firms use
p−σN cNLNt
P 1−σNt
+ τ (
p∗N)
−σ
cSLSt
P 1−σSt
units
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of labor for each variety produced and there are nNt varieties produced, so total employment
in northern production is p
−σ
N cNLNtnNt
P 1−σNt
+ τ (
p∗N)
−σ
cSLStnNt
P 1−σSt
= (XN + τX∗N )Lt. As LNt denotes the
supply of labor in the North, full employment requires that LNt = aNδg1+βLt + (XN + τX∗N )Lt.
Evaluating at time t = 0 yields the steady-state full employment of labor condition for the North:
LN0 =
[
aNδg
1+β +XN + τX∗N
]
L0. (30)
In the South, labor is employed in adaptive R&D by foreign affiliates, imitative R&D directed
towards foreign affiliate varieties, imitative R&D directed towards northern varieties, foreign affiliate
production, and southern production by the two types of imitating firms (I-firms and C-firms).
Each variety transferred to the South by a foreign affiliate requires aFφβ/nθt units of labor, so total
employment in adaptive R&D is (aFφβ/nθt ) (n˙Ft + n˙It). Each foreign affiliate variety imitated by
a southern firm requires aIι
β
S/n
θ
t units of imitative R&D labor, so total employment in imitative
R&D directed towards foreign affiliate varieties is (aIι
β
S/n
θ
t )n˙It. Similarly, each northern variety
imitated by a southern firm requires daIι
β
N/n
θ
t units of labor, so total employment in imitative
R&D directed towards northern varieties is (daIι
β
N/n
θ
t )n˙Ct. Turning to production in the South,
a foreign affiliate uses p
−σ
F cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ τ (
p∗F )
−σ
cNLNt
P 1−σNt
= XFLtnFt + τ
X∗FLt
nFt
units of labor for each variety
produced and there are nFt varieties produced, so total employment in foreign affiliate production
is
(
XFLt
nFt
+ τ X
∗
FLt
nFt
)
nFt = (XF + τX∗F )Lt. A southern firm imitating a foreign affiliate variety uses
ζ
(
p−σI cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ τ (
p∗I)
−σ
cNLNt
P 1−σNt
)
= ζ
(
XI
Lt
nIt
+ τX∗I
Lt
nIt
)
units of labor for each variety produced, and
there are nIt such varieties produced, so total employment by I-firms is ζ
(
XI
Lt
nIt
+ τX∗I
Lt
nIt
)
nIt =
ζ (XI + τX∗I )Lt. A southern firm imitating a northern variety uses ζ
(
p−σC cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ τ (
p∗C)
−σ
cNLNt
P 1−σNt
)
=
ζ
(
XC
Lt
nCt
+ τX∗C
Lt
nCt
)
units of labor for each variety produced, and there are nCt such varieties
produced, so total employment by C-firms is ζ
(
XC
Lt
nCt
+ τX∗C
Lt
nCt
)
nCt = ζ (XC + τX∗C)Lt. As
LSt denotes the supply of labor in the South, full employment requires that
LSt =
aFφ
β
nθt
(n˙Ft + n˙It)+
aIι
β
S
nθt
n˙It+
daIι
β
N
nθt
n˙Ct+(XF + τX∗F )Lt+ζ (XI + τX
∗
I )Lt+ζ (XC + τX
∗
C)Lt.
Using the definitions of φ, ιS , ιN , δ and evaluating at time t = 0, we obtain the steady-state full
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employment of labor condition for the South:
LS0 =
(
aFφ
1+βγN + aIι
1+β
S γF + daIι
1+β
N γN
)
δL0
+ [XF + τX∗F + ζ (XI + τX
∗
I +XC + τX
∗
C)]L0. (31)
2.8 Aggregate Demand
To solve the model, we need steady-state values for the aggregate demand terms XN , X∗N , XI , X
∗
I ,
XC and X∗C . Solving for the ratio XN/X
∗
F yields
XN
X∗F
=
p−σN cNLNtnNt
P 1−σNt Lt
(p∗F )
−σ
cNLNtnFt
P 1−σNt Lt
=
(
pN
p∗F
)−σ nNt/nt
nFt/nt
=
( wN
α
τwS
α
)−σ
γN
γF
=
( τ
w
)σ gg+φ+ιN
φ
g+φ+ιN
g
g+ιS
=
( τ
w
)σ g + ιS
φ
and by doing similar calculations looking at other ratios, we obtain that
XN = X∗F
( τ
w
)σ g + ιS
φ
X∗N = XF
(
1
τw
)σ g + ιS
φ
XI = XF
(
1
α
)σ ιS
g
X∗I = X
∗
F
(
1
α
)σ ιS
g
XC = XF
(
1
ζ
)σ (g + ιS) ιN
φg
and
X∗C =
 X
∗
F
(
1
ζ
)σ
(g+ιS)ιN
φg if
wN
wS
≥ τζα
X∗F
(
τ
αw
)σ (g+ιS)ιN
φg if
wN
wS
< τζα .
2.9 Consumer Expenditure and Asset Ownership
To determine consumer expenditures cN and cS , we need to specify who owns the firms and how
wealth is distributed between the North and the South. We assume that R&D done in the North
is financed by northern savings and R&D done in the South is financed by southern savings. Then
in equilibrium, northern firms end up being owned by northern consumers, southern firms end up
being owned by southern consumers and foreign affiliates end up being jointly owned by consumers
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in both regions.
Let ANt denote the aggregate value of northern financial assets and ASt denote the aggregate
value of southern financial assets. The aggregate value of all financial assets is At ≡ ANt + ASt =
nNtυNt + nFtυFt + nItυIt + nCtυCt. Since consumer savings within the South finance the R&D
investments in the South, ASt = nFt (υFt − υNt)+nItυIt+nCtυCt. Substituting into this expression
using the firm values (23), (24) and (25), we obtain
ASt = wSδLt
[
γFaFφ
β + γIaIι
β
S + γCdaIι
β
N
]
.
Since ANt = At − ASt = nNtvNt + nFtvNt, substituting into this expression using the firm value
(22) yields
ANt = wNLt (γN + γF ) aNδgβ.
Let a˜it denote the financial asset holdings of the typical consumer in region i (i = N,S). The
intertemporal budget constraint of a typical consumer in region i is ˙˜ait = wi + ρa˜it − ci − gLa˜it. In
any steady-state equilibrium where the wage rates wi are constant over time, we must have that
˙˜ait = 0 and it follows that ci = wi+(ρ− gL) a˜it. For the typical northern consumer, a˜Nt = ANt/LNt
and for the typical southern consumer, a˜St = ASt/LSt. Setting wS = 1 and wN = wNwS ≡ w, it
follows that typical northern and southern consumer expenditure levels are given by
cN = w
[
1 + (ρ− gL) (γN + γF ) aNδgβ L0
LN0
]
(32)
and
cS = 1 + (ρ− gL) δ
[
γFaFφ
β + γIaIι
β
S + γCdaIι
β
N
] L0
LS0
. (33)
Having solved for consumer expenditures cN and cS , we can determine the ratio X∗F /XF and
simplifying yields the steady-state asset condition
X∗F
XF
=
(
pF
p∗F
)σ cN
cS
LN0
LS0
P 1−σSt
P 1−σNt
(34)
where
P 1−σSt
P 1−σNt
=
γN (p∗N )
1−σ + γF p1−σF + γIp
1−σ
I + γCp
1−σ
C
γNp
1−σ
N + γF
(
p∗F
)1−σ + γI (p∗I)1−σ + γC (p∗C)1−σ
is constant over time.
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Thus, solving this model for a steady-state equilibrium reduces to solving a system of 7 equations
[(26), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31), (34)] in 7 unknowns [w, δ, φ, ιN , ιS , XF , X∗F ], where the
7 equations are: four R&D conditions (innovative, adaptive, two imitative), two labor market
conditions (North and South) and one asset condition.
3 Numerical Results
3.1 Parameter Values
The system of 7 equations in 7 unknowns is solved numerically. We calibrate the model to fit the
world in 1990, prior to the signing of the TRIPs agreement, and in 2005, after its implementation. In
our computer simulations, we used the following benchmark parameter values: ρ = 0.07, α = 0.714,
gL = 0.014, θ = 0.72, LN0 = 1, LS0 = 2, ζ = 0.9, β = 1, τ = 1.54 for 1990 and τ = 1.33 for 2005,
aN = 1, aF = 100.5, d = 261, aI = 2.96 for 1990 and aI = 11.8 for 2005.4
The subjective discount rate ρ is set at 0.07 to reflect a real interest rate of 7 percent, consistent
with the average real return on the US stock market over the 20th century (Mehra and Prescott,
1985). The measure of product differentiation α determines the markup of price over marginal cost
1/α. It is set at 0.714 to generate a northern markup of 40 percent, which is within the range of
estimates from Basu (1996) and Norrbin (1993). The parameter gL is set at 0.014 to reflect a 1.4
percent population growth rate. This was the average annual world population growth rate during
the 1990s according to the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2011). The steady-state
economic growth rate is calculated from gu = gL/ ((σ − 1) (1− θ)). In order to generate a steady-
state economic growth rate of 2 percent, consistent with the average US GDP per capita growth
rate from 1950 to 1994 (Jones, 1995), the R&D spillover parameter θ is set at 0.72. Since only the
ratio LN0/LS0 matters, we set LN0 = 1 and LS0 = 2 so LN0/LS0 equals the ratio of working-age
population in high-income countries to that in middle-income countries (World Bank, 2003). The
cost parameter ζ is set at 0.9 so southern firms have 10 percent lower production costs than foreign
affiliates. Empirical studies on patents and R&D suggests that there are significant decreasing
returns to R&D at the industry-level. Given that point estimates of 1/(1 + β) lie between 0.1 and
0.6 (Kortum, 1993), we set β = 1 which yields the intermediate value 1/(1 + β) = 0.5.
During the time period 1990-2005 when the TRIPs agreement was being implemented, North-
South trade costs were falling. We use the micro-founded measure of bilateral trade costs developed
4The MATLAB files used to solve the model can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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by Novy (2011) that indirectly infers trade frictions from observable trade data. By linear extrapo-
lation of the bilateral trade cost estimates between the US and Mexico in 1970 and 2000, we obtain
a tariff-equivalent of 54 percent for 1990 (τ = 1.54) and 33 percent in 2005 (τ = 1.33).
The remaining parameters are the R&D productivity parameters aN (innovation), aF (adap-
tion), aI (southern imitation) and the “distance” parameter d that captures the extra cost of
imitating northern-produced varieties. Since only the relative difference between the R&D produc-
tivity parameters matters, we can normalize aN to 1. The parameters aF = 100.5 and d = 261
are set so FDI and imitation start off being equally important modes of international technology
transfer (the FDI rate φ equals the northern imitation rate ιN in the 1990 benchmark), and north-
ern consumer expenditure is 2.5 times as large as southern consumer expenditure (cN/cS = 2.5).
The average US-Mexico consumption-share adjusted GDP per worker ratio during the time period
1990-2005 was around 2.5 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2011). The parameter aI is our measure
of IPR protection in the South. Stronger IPR protection makes imitation more difficult; hence
stronger IPR protection is captured by a higher aI . We set a low value for aI in 1990 to capture
weak IPR protection in the South prior to the TRIPs agreement. By setting aI = 2.96, we obtain
a high southern imitation rate ιS = .25 in the 1990 benchmark (one out of four products produced
by foreign affiliates is copied each year). Finally, we set a higher value for aI in 2005 to capture
stronger IPR protection after the implementation of the TRIPs agreement. In particular, we set
aI = 11.8 so the model is consistent with the evidence of a ten-fold increase in the FDI inflow to
developing countries between 1990 and 2005 (UNCTAD, 2011).
In the model, the FDI inflow to developing countries is captured by LFt (the total amount of
southern labor devoted to adaptive R&D activities by foreign affiliates multiplied by the southern
wage rate wS = 1). Rewriting (19) using the definitions for the FDI rate φ, the relative R&D
difficulty δ and the variety share of northern firms γN , the FDI inflow measure can be written as
LFt = φ1+βγNδaFLt. The ratio LFt/Lt is constant over time in any steady-state equilibrium so we
obtain
LF0 = φ1+βγNδaFL0.
In 1990 the FDI inflow to developing countries (including transition economies) was 34.9 billion US
dollars and in 2005 the FDI inflow was 363.4 billion US dollars (UNCTAD, 2011). This represents
a roughly ten-fold increase in the FDI inflow to developing countries measured in current prices.
Adjusting the FDI inflow in 1990 for population growth and inflation from 1990 to 2005 generates
26
an expected FDI inflow of 59.7 billion US dollars for 2005.5 The ratio of the observed FDI inflow to
this expected FDI inflow yields a six-fold increase in the FDI inflow to developing countries during
the time period 1990-2005 that can be attributed to policy changes (the decrease in τ and increase
in aI). So we set aI = 2.96 in 1990 and aI = 11.8 in 2005 to assure a small FDI inflow LF0 in 1990
and a six-fold increase in LF0 by 2005.
3.2 The Main Results
The model is solved numerically using the benchmark parameters discussed in Section 3.1. Columns
1 and 2 of Table 1 show the results for the 1990 and 2005 benchmarks. Going from the 1990 to the
2005 benchmark, the model is able to replicate the large 10-fold observed increase in FDI inflows
to developing countries from 1990 to 2005 (LF0 increases from .015 to .089, a 6-fold increase).
The model can also account for large North-South wage differences. In the 1990 benchmark, the
northern wage wN is 2.34 times as high as the southern wage wS (wN/wS = 2.34).
During the time period from 1990 to 2005, WTO-member developing countries implemented
stronger IPR protection but also reduced their trade barriers. In order to disentangle the welfare
effects of stronger IPR protection and trade liberalization, we solve the model for two counterfactual
scenarios. In the first counterfactual, presented in column 3 of Table 1, it is assumed that trade
costs are at their 2005 level (τ = 1.33), but that southern IPR protection remains unchanged from
its 1990 pre-TRIPs level (aI = 2.96). This would be the case if trade liberalization had followed
the same path as in our benchmark scenario, but the TRIPs agreement had not been implemented.
In the second counterfactual, presented in column 4, trade costs are kept at the same level as 1990
(τ = 1.54), but southern IPR protection is at the 2005 post-TRIPs level (aI = 11.8). This would
be the case if the TRIPs agreement had been implemented but not accompanied by lower trade
costs.
We find that both the North and the South are better off in the post-TRIPs scenario (comparing
columns 1 and 2). Our measure of long-run consumer welfare in the North uN0 increases from 364.7
to 394.3 and our measure of long-run welfare for the South uS0 increases from 142.0 to 163.1.6 The
5From 1990 to 2005, the US GDP implicit price deflator increased by 38.4 percent (Federal Reserve Bank of St
Louis, 2011). During the same time period, the world population grew by 23.4 percent using the 1.4 percent annual
population growth rate. Multiplying the observed FDI inflow in 1990 by the population growth and inflation over
the period generates the expected FDI inflow in 2005 in the absence of any policy changes.
6Welfare is measured as the consumer utility for the representative consumer at time 0 (uN0 = cN/PN0 and
uS0 = cS/PS0). Steady-state consumer expenditures for the typical northern and southern consumers were derived
in (32) and (33). The steady-state price index in each region depends on (i) a constant component of variety shares
and product prices, and (ii) the number of varieties nt. For welfare comparisons across steady-states for different
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gain is proportionally larger for the South, where consumer welfare is 15 percent higher in the
post-TRIPs case and the northern gain is 8 percent. Taking only lower trade costs into account
and setting southern IPR protection at its 1990 level (column 3), the resulting lower price indexes
leads to some welfare gains for both northern and southern consumers (uN0 increases from 364.7 to
378.4 and uS0 increases from 142.0 to 149.2). If instead the model is solved holding North-South
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1990 2005 (A) (B) (C)
τ = 1.54 τ = 1.33 τ = 1.33 τ = 1.54 τ = 1.33
aI = 2.96 aI = 11.8 aI = 2.96 aI = 11.8 aI = 500
wN/wS 2.34 2.17 2.32 2.18 2.22
δ 22.01 22.57 22.01 22.57 23.46
φ .002 .004 .002 .004 .006
ιS .250 .049 .250 .049 .001
ιN .002 .000 .002 .000 .000
γN .942 .925 .942 .925 .885
γF .005 .035 .005 .035 .112
γI .024 .034 .024 .034 .003
γC .029 .006 .029 .006 .000
LF0 .015 .089 .015 .089 .263
cN 2.75 2.56 2.73 2.58 2.65
cS 1.10 1.07 1.10 1.07 1.15
cN/cS 2.50 2.39 2.49 2.40 2.31
PN0 .0075 .0065 .0072 .0068 .0063
PS0 .0077 .0066 .0074 .0069 .0064
uN0 364.7 394.3 378.4 379.4 418.2
uS0 142.0 163.1 149.2 155.6 180.4
Table 1: Pre- and post-TRIPs benchmarks and three counterfactual scenarios
trade costs at the 1990 level but assuming that southern IPR protection is at its post-TRIPs level
(column 4), consumer utilities in both regions are substantially higher than in the 1990 benchmark
scenario, and closer to the 2005 post-TRIPs benchmark scenario (uN0 increases from 364.7 to 379.4
and uS0 increases from 142.0 to 155.6). Stronger southern IPR protection not only enhances the
welfare gains from lower North-South trade costs - most of the welfare gains over the time period
can be attributed to stronger IPR protection.
To understand what is driving these welfare gains, we first look at the equilibrium effects of
TRIPs. In response to stronger southern IPR protection but not to trade liberalization (comparing
columns 1 and 4), the southern imitation rate ιS falls from 0.250 to 0.049 and the northern imitation
scenarios, we evaluate the price indexes at time 0 using n0 = (δL0)
1/(1−θ), which follows from the definition of δ.
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rate ιN falls from .002 to almost zero. Faced with this lower imitation risk, northern firms choose to
increase their adaptive R&D spending and transfer production to foreign affiliates at a faster rate
(the FDI rate φ increases from .002 to .004). Consequently, world production is redistributed from
the North to the South as the variety share of northern firms γN falls from .942 to .925 and the
share of world production in the South (γF + γI + γC) increases from .058 to .075. As production
is transferred to the South, northern resources are freed up from production activities, causing
downward pressure on the northern wage rate (wN/wS decreases from 2.34 to 2.18). Northern
firms respond by employing more workers in innovative R&D, leading to a temporary increase in the
innovation rate. In the long run, the innovation rate reverts back to its steady-state level g = gL/(1−
θ), which is pinned down by parameter values and is not affected by policy changes. However, the
temporary increase in innovation means that relative R&D difficulty becomes permanently higher
(δ increases from 22.01 to 22.57). Comparing relative R&D difficulty in the two counterfactual
scenarios (columns 3 and 4) confirms that it is the TRIPs-induced redistribution of production and
not trade liberalization that leads to more innovation.
We are now in a position to understand the welfare effects of TRIPs, in particular, why the
South benefits from stronger IPR protection. When aI increases due to TRIPs (from 2.96 to 11.8),
southern consumer utility uS0 increases by 10 percent (from 142.0 to 155.6). Using the equation
uS0 = cS/PS0, we can decompose this 10 percent increase into a 2 percent decrease in southern
consumer expenditure cS (from 1.10 to 1.07) and a 12 percent increase in the inverse southern price
index P−1S0 (from 129.87 to 144.93). We discuss first why cS = 1 + (ρ− gL) δ[γFaFφβ + γIaIιβS +
γCdaIι
β
N ]
L0
LS0
changes and then why P−1S0 = [γN (p
∗
N )
1−σ+γF p1−σF +γIp
1−σ
I +γCp
1−σ
C ]
1/(σ−1) ·n1/(σ−1)0
changes.
Southern consumer expenditure cS falls because there is a drop in the total market value of the
firms that southern consumers own. This change is mainly driven by what happens to southern
firms that have imitated northern products (the C-firms). Due to stronger IPR protection, the
number of such firms shrinks drastically (γC decreases from .029 to .006) and their total market
value falls as a result (δγCdaIι
β
N decreases from .76 to .12). When there is a drop in the market value
of the assets that southern consumers own, these consumers have to cut back on their expenditures.
However, the 2 percent decrease in southern consumer expenditure is dominated by the 12
percent increase in the inverse southern price index, implying that TRIPs makes southern consumers
better off. There are two reasons for the favorable change in the southern price index. First, because
stronger IPR protection leads to more FDI (φ increases from .002 to .004), more production moves
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from the higher-wage North to the lower-wage South (γN decreases from .942 to .925) and southern
consumers benefit from being able to buy more products at lower prices ([γN (p∗N )
1−σ + γF p1−σF +
γIp
1−σ
I +γCp
1−σ
C ]
1/(σ−1) increases from .322 to .348). Second, because stronger IPR protection leads
to more innovation (δ increases from 22.01 to 22.57), southern consumers benefit from being able
to buy a greater variety of products (n1/(σ−1)0 increases from 401.13 to 415.70). And the increase
in innovation is ultimately driven by the increase in FDI, which leads to more production moving
from the North to the South, depressing the wages of northern workers and stimulating northern
firms to do more R&D.
To summarize, we find that TRIPs (stronger southern IPR protection) leads to more FDI (φ
increases from .002 to .004), more innovation (δ increases from 22.01 to 22.57), and considerably
higher long-run southern consumer welfare (uS0 increases from 142.0 to 155.6). The South also
benefits from the trade liberalization that occurred from 1990 to 2005 but the welfare gains from
TRIPs are considerably larger (uS0 only increases from 142.0 to 149.2 due to trade liberalization).
Furthermore, we find that trade liberalization by itself has a negligible effect in stimulating FDI
(LF0 increases from .0149 to .0150), so most of the 10-fold observed increase in FDI inflows to
developing countries from 1990 to 2005 can be attributed to stronger southern IPR protection (LF0
increases from .0149 to .0892 when only aI is raised). This big increase in FDI is the main reason
why TRIPs is good for developing countries in our analysis.
The final column of Table 1 shows what happens when southern IPR protection is very strong
(aI = 500, which has approximately the same effect as aI = +∞). Both imitation rates fall to
almost zero (ιN = .000008, ιS = .001) and we get the highest FDI rate (φ = .006). Consequently, a
large part of production is transferred from the North to foreign affiliates in the South (γF increases
to .112) and the share of southern firms almost disappears (γI + γC = .003). The interesting thing
about this case is that we obtain the best long-run outcome for southern consumers (uS0 increases
to 180.4). Developing countries benefit from TRIPs and they would benefit even more with very
strong southern IPR protection, essentially eliminating imitation.
3.3 The Implications of Alternative Parameter Values
In other dynamic general equilibrium models of North-South trade by Helpman (1993), Lai (1998),
and Branstetter and Saggi (2011), it is assumed that FDI is costless. In these models, a northern
firm can transfer production to a foreign affiliate in the South without incurring any costs. We
assume that FDI, just like innovation and imitation, is a costly activity. A foreign affiliate must
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devote labor to adaptive R&D to learn how to produce the parent firm’s product variety in the
South.
For comparison with these earlier models, we solve our model for low-cost and costless FDI.
Costless FDI corresponds to setting aF = 0 in our model. In this exercise, we set τ = 1 to
facilitate comparison with the above-mentioned literature (all of which assume costless trade) and
to guarantee that the assumption τ < wN/wS continues to be satisfied (this assumption guarantees
that foreign affiliates export their products back to the North). As shown in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 2, the assumption of costless trade hardly changes the variety shares but generates lower price
indexes as expected. Columns 2 to 5 shows the results of assuming less costly FDI, captured by
lower values of aF . We find that lowering aF causes the North-South wage ratio to fall drastically
(wN/wS decreases from 2.134 to 1.788 to 1.199). In the special case of costless FDI (column 5), the
northern wage rate is only 1.3 percent higher than the southern wage rate (wN/wS = 1.013). Thus,
the standard assumption of costless FDI appears to be very strong —an issue that to our knowledge
has not been pointed out in the related literature. When FDI is costless, so much production is
transferred from the North to the South that the North-South wage difference becomes very small,
negligible compared to the large wage differences that we observe between developed and developing
countries.
Technology in our model is transferred from the North to the South through both FDI and
imitation. We began this section by choosing 1990 benchmark parameter values to guarantee that
FDI and imitation are equally important modes of international technology transfer (ιN/φ = 1).
We now explore how things change when this property is relaxed. In particular, we are interested
in what happens when imitation is more important than FDI as a mode of international technology
transfer. Do we still find that stronger southern IPR protection (TRIPs) increases consumer welfare
in both regions? In Table 3, we present results from studying three cases (ιN/φ = 5, ιN/φ = 2 and
ιN/φ = 1) to show that the model can generate three different outcomes.
To obtain the 1990 benchmark parameter values (underlying the results in column 1 of Table
1), we used three properties (ιN/φ = 1, cN/cS = 2.5, ιS = .25) to determine three parameter values
(aF = 100.5, d = 261, aI = 2.96). To obtain an alternative 1990 benchmark where ιN/φ = 5 (the
imitation rate ιN is five times as large as the FDI rate φ), we proceed correspondingly and solve
for the values of aF , d, and aI that satisfy ιN/φ = 5, cN/cS = 2.5 and ιS = .25. These calculations
yield aF = 373, d = 149 and aI = 3.52, given that the other parameter values are the same as in the
original 1990 benchmark. The results with this alternative benchmark are presented in column 1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2005 Costless FDI
τ = 1.33 τ = 1 τ = 1 τ = 1 τ = 1
aF = 100.5 aF = 100.5 aF = 25 aF = 0.5 aF = 0
wN/wS 2.166 2.134 1.788 1.199 1.013
δ 22.57 22.57 24.22 38.55 56.68
φ .004 .004 .009 .058 .146
ιS .049 .049 .026 .006 .004
ιN .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
γN .925 .925 .850 .464 .255
γF .035 .035 .097 .474 .694
γI .034 .035 .051 .061 .050
γC .006 .006 .003 .000 .000
LF0 .089 .090 .116 .089 .000
cN 2.56 2.52 2.13 1.56 1.47
cS 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.06 1.01
cN/cS 2.39 2.35 1.98 1.47 1.46
PN0 .0065 .0058 .0043 .0016 .0009
PS0 .0066 .0058 .0043 .0016 .0009
uN0 394.3 437.9 493.2 961.6 1668.1
uS0 163.1 186.2 249.2 652.1 1144.9
Table 2: The steady-state equilibrium implications of less costly and costless FDI
of Table 3 and the effects of a marginal increase in aI from 3.52 to 4.0 (holding all other parameter
values fixed) are presented in column 2.
Interestingly, columns 1 and 2 show that it is no longer the case that stronger southern IPR
protection increases consumer welfare in both regions. In fact, we find that stronger IPR protection
decreases consumer welfare in both the South and the North (when aI increases from 3.52 to 4.0,
uS0 decreases from 139.6 to 137.1 and uN0 decreases from 359.83 to 359.76). There is a problem
with these numerical results, however. When aI increases from 3.52 to 4.0, γN increases from
.939 to .942 and γF + γI + γC decreases from .061 to .058. Thus stronger IPR protection leads
to the North exporting more products and the South exporting fewer products. This is the exact
opposite of what Branstetter, Fisman, Foley and Saggi (2011) find when they look at the effects of
stronger IPR protection in developing countries. As we mentioned in the introduction, they find
that developing countries export more products after IPR reforms.
Next we consider the case where ιN/φ = 2 (the imitation rate ιN is two times as large as the
FDI rate φ). To obtain benchmark parameter values that generate this outcome, we follow the
same procedure as described above. We solve for the values of aF , d, and aI that satisfy ιN/φ = 2,
cN/cS = 2.5 and ιS = .25. These calculations yield aF = 166, d = 190 and aI = 3.2, given that
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ιN/φ = 5 ιN/φ = 2 ιN/φ = 1
aF = 373 aF = 166 aF = 100.5
d = 149 d = 190 d = 261
aI = 3.52 aI = 4.0 aI = 3.2 aI = 4.0 aI = 2.96 aI = 4.0
wN/wS 2.45 2.47 2.39 2.39 2.34 2.29
δ 21.87 21.85 21.94 21.96 22.01 22.11
φ .0005 .0006 .0011 .0013 .0015 .0021
ιS .250 .226 .250 .199 .250 .172
ιN .0027 .0024 .0021 .0017 .0015 .0011
γN .939 .942 .940 .943 .942 .941
γF .002 .002 .003 .005 .005 .009
γI .008 .010 .016 .020 .024 .030
γC .051 .046 .040 .032 .029 .020
LF0 .007 .009 .011 .018 .015 .027
cN 2.87 2.90 2.80 2.80 2.75 2.69
cS 1.15 1.14 1.12 1.11 1.10 1.08
cN/cS 2.50 2.55 2.50 2.54 2.50 2.49
PN0 .0080 .0081 .0077 .0077 .0075 .0073
PS0 .0082 .0083 .0079 .0079 .0077 .0075
uN0 359.83 359.76 362.3 363.4 364.7 367.7
uS0 139.6 137.1 140.9 139.3 142.0 144.2
Table 3: Alternative 1990 benchmarks
the other parameter values are the same as in the original 1990 benchmark. The results with this
alternative 1990 benchmark are presented in column 3 of Table 3 and the effects of a marginal
increase in aI from 3.2 to 4.0 (holding all other parameter values fixed) are presented in column 4.
In the ιN/φ = 2 case, we find that stronger IPR protection decreases consumer welfare in
the South but increases consumer welfare in the North (when aI increases from 3.2 to 4.0, uS0
decreases from 140.9 to 139.3 and uN0 increases from 362.3 to 363.4). Thus, without changing any
assumptions, just by appropriately choosing benchmark parameter values, our model can support
the conventional wisdom that TRIPs is bad for developing countries and only benefits developed
countries. However, we encounter the same problem with the ιN/φ = 2 case as with the ιN/φ = 5
case. Stronger IPR protection leads the North to export more products and the South to export
fewer products (when aI increases from 3.2 to 4.0, γN increases from .940 to .943 and γF + γI + γC
decreases from .060 to .057).
Finally, we present the ιN/φ = 1 case in columns 5 and 6. Column 5 just reproduces the earlier
results from column 1 of Table 1 and column 6 shows the effects of a marginal increase in aI . In
this case, we find that stronger IPR protection increases consumer welfare in both regions (when
33
aI increases from 2.96 to 4.0, uS0 increases from 142.0 to 144.2 and uN0 increases from 364.7 to
367.7). Furthermore, stronger IPR protection leads to the North exporting fewer products and the
South exporting more products (when aI increases from 2.96 to 4.0, γN decreases from .942 to .941
and γF + γI + γC increases from .058 to .059). Thus, of the three cases that we study in Table
5, only the ιN/φ = 1 case is consistent with the evidence that developing countries export more
products after IPR reforms.
4 Concluding Comments
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that the TRIPs agreement is bad for developing
countries. We present a dynamic general equilibrium model of North-South trade that allows us
to study the implications of stronger IPR protection and simultaneous trade liberalization. In the
model, firms engage in innovative R&D to develop new product varieties in the North and foreign
affiliates of these northern firms engage in adaptive R&D to learn how to produce these product
varieties in the South. There are also southern firms that can engage in imitative R&D to learn
how to produce both the product varieties of northern firms and their foreign affiliates. So over
time, the production of every product variety moves from the North to the South and international
technology transfer occurs both through FDI and imitation.
We find that stronger IPR protection in the South (TRIPs) induces foreign affiliates of northern
firms to increase their R&D expenditures and results in a faster rate of technology transfer within
these multinational firms, consistent with the empirical evidence in Branstetter, Fisman and Foley
(2006). As a result of TRIPs, more product varieties end up being produced in the South and
exports of new products increase, consistent with the empirical evidence in Branstetter, Fisman,
Foley and Saggi (2011). TRIPs also stimulates innovative R&D spending by northern firms and
results in faster economic growth in the South, consistent with the empirical evidence in Gould and
Gruben (1996). When we solve the model numerically for plausible parameter values, we find that
TRIPs leads to significantly higher long-run southern consumer welfare. The welfare gains from
the trade liberalization that has occurred are not nearly as large as the welfare gains from TRIPs.
Many years ago, Deardorff (1992) developed a partial equilibrium model where imitation is
immediate and costless in the absence of IPR protection. He showed that as more of the world
is covered by IPR protection, the additional innovation that can be stimulated by the resulting
monopoly profits of patent-holding innovators becomes smaller and smaller. Eventually the benefits
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from more innovation are outweighed by the loss of consumer surplus from monopoly pricing. Thus,
when the innovating country is sufficiently large, the imitating country is better off not protecting
intellectual property. Based on this analysis, Deardorff (1990) concluded that “patent protection is
almost certain to redistribute welfare away from developing countries” and he added, “If I could be
convinced that a patent system would be the magical key to unlocking the secret of development
for those who need it most, then I would gladly change the conclusion of this paper. But at the
moment I do not see how that case can credibly be made.” It has taken a long time but this paper
is our response.
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Appendix 1: Related Literature
In this appendix, we review the related literature about TRIPs in more detail. We discuss models
without FDI, models with costless FDI, models with costly FDI and evidence about TRIPs.
Models without FDI
The first models of North-South trade and IPR protection provided support for the conventional
wisdom that TRIPs is harmful for developing countries. The first such model was Chin and Gross-
man (1990), who used a global duopoly structure where a northern firm had the capacity to innovate
and a southern firm could costlessly imitate the production process invented by the northern firm in
absence of IPR protection. There is innovation and imitation in this model, but no FDI. The gain
from IPR protection in the Chin and Grossman model comes from additional expected monopoly
profits for the northern firm, which stimulates further innovation. While the North always benefits
from IPR protection in the South, the South itself is found to benefit only when the prospects of
cost-savings through R&D are quite substantial or when the South comprises a sufficiently large
share of the overall market for the good. The interests of the North and the South generally con-
flict, with the South benefiting from the ability to pirate technology and the North harmed by such
actions.
Deardorff (1992) presents another partial equilibrium model where imitation is immediate and
costless in absence of IPR protection. In his model, imitation results in perfect competition and
there is a continuum of new products that can be invented. All consumers have identical preferences
and all firms have the same marginal cost of production. Deardorff finds that as more of the world
is covered by IPR protection, the additional innovation that can be stimulated by the resulting
monopoly profits of the patent-holding innovators becomes smaller and smaller. Eventually the
benefits from more innovation are outweighed by the loss in consumer surplus from monopoly
pricing. Thus, when the innovating country is sufficiently large, the imitating country is better off
not protecting intellectual property. Based on this analysis, Deardorff (1990, p.507) concludes that
“patent protection is almost certain to redistribute welfare away from developing countries.”7
Diwan and Rodrik (1992) present a partial equilibrium model of IPR protection with the new
feature that consumers in the North and South have different preferences. The two regions therefore
7At the end of his paper, Deardorff (1992, p.50) does point out that “information about many new inventions is
not costlessly transmitted abroad, and that extending patent protection may therefore be beneficial to the extent
that it stimulates the transfer of technology.” However, he does not develop this insight further.
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compete with each other to encourage the development of technologies most suited to their needs.
Innovation only takes place in the North while imitation takes place in both regions. The reason
for the South to implement IPR protection in their model is to encourage innovation in the South’s
preferred range of products. Diwan and Rodrik find that a reduction in preference differences
between the two regions reduces the optimal level of patent protection in the South and that “free
riding on the North makes eminently good sense” in the absence of preference differences.8
Partial equilibrium models do not allow for any feedback effects on labor demand, wage rates
and consumer expenditures, or any general equilibrium price effects which in turn have real effects
on consumer welfare. Helpman (1993) presented the first welfare analysis of IPR protection using a
dynamic general equilibrium model of North-South trade. In this model with innovation, imitation
but no FDI, innovation is a costly activity that takes place in the North and imitation in the
South is costless. The typical northern consumer buys goods for consumption but also saves and
invests in firms that engage in innovative R&D (the development of new product varieties). The
typical southern consumer spends all of her income on consumption. Starting from a steady-
state equilibrium, Helpman finds that the South loses from a marginal decrease in the exogenous
imitation rate and the North loses as well if the imitation rate is sufficiently small. Thus stronger
IPR protection (a lower exogenous imitation rate) is bad for developing countries in this model.
Grossman and Lai (2004) study a dynamic general equilibrium model with two countries (North
and South) that are both capable of innovating. The two countries differ in market size and in
their capacity for conducting innovative R&D. The North has a larger market for newly innovated
products and a larger endowment of human capital which is necessary for innovation. Imitation is
costless when it occurs and due to special assumptions about consumer preferences, no economic
growth occurs in equilibrium (regardless of what patent policies countries adopt). Solving for a
Nash equilibrium in patent policies, Grossman and Lai show that patent protection will be stronger
in the North than in the South. Among patent policies that generate the same overall incentives
for global innovation, the North fares better and the South worse, the stronger is patent protection
in the South. Grossman and Lai also conclude that a treaty like TRIPs that essentially harmonizes
patent policy may well benefit the North at the expense of the South.
From our perspective, the main drawback of the above-mentioned models is that there is no
FDI. In these models, no international technology transfer takes place within multinational firms.
8We consider it to be a strength of our model that we assume identical consumer preferences in the two regions
and can still show that the South benefits from stronger IPR protection (TRIPs). Given the analysis in Diwan and
Rodrik (1992), the case for TRIPs becomes stronger if there are North-South differences in consumer preferences.
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FDI is central to our explanation for why TRIPs is good for developing countries.
Models with costless FDI
Helpman (1993) also presents a second model with costless innovation, costless imitation and cost-
less FDI. Innovation takes place at a constant exogenous rate in the North and once a northern firm
has innovated, it can costlessly form a manufacturing subsidiary in the South to take advantage
of lower labor costs there. For a firm that innovates, the risk of imitation is assumed to be inde-
pendent of whether the firm produces in the North or in the South. Starting from a steady-state
equilibrium, Helpman finds that the South loses from a marginal decrease in the exogenous imita-
tion rate (stronger IPR protection) and the North loses as well if the imitation rate is sufficiently
small. In this model, costless FDI leads to factor price equalization: there are no wage differences
between the North and the South in equilibrium.
Of the papers that we have discussed so far, all support the perspective that TRIPs is probably
bad for developing countries. With Lai (1998), we start to encounter a more favorable view of
TRIPs. He presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of North-South trade with costly in-
novation, costless imitation and costless FDI. Northern firms do innovative R&D to develop new
product varieties and then choose whether to produce in the higher-wage North or in the lower-
wage South. Unlike in Helpman (1993), Lai assumes that for a firm that innovates, there is only
a risk of imitation if the firm produces in the South. If the firm produces in the North, it earns
monopoly profits forever. With these new assumptions, Lai finds that stronger IPR protection (a
lower southern imitation rate) leads to a higher rate of innovation and a higher rate of technology
transfer to the South. These conclusions continue to hold in a more general model with imitation of
northern products if the FDI rate is sufficiently high. But the opposite conclusions hold if imitation
is the only mode of international technology transfer. Lai does not comment on which case is more
relevant (FDI or imitation as the dominant mode of international technology transfer) and does
not study the welfare effects of stronger IPR protection.9
Building on Lai (1998), Branstetter and Saggi (2011) have recently developed a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium North-South trade model where imitation is treated as a costly activity and the
9We showed in Table 3 that when imitation and FDI start off being equally important modes of international
technology transfer, stronger IPR protection leads to a higher rate of innovation and a higher rate of technology
transfer to the South, making southern consumers better off. However, when imitation starts off being five times
more important than FDI as a mode of international technology transfer, stronger IPR protection leads to a lower
rate of innovation and a lower rate of technology transfer to the South, making southern consumers worse off. We
argued that the first case is more relevant.
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southern rate of imitation is endogenously determined. They assume that imitation only targets
multinationals in the South and in effect shut down the imitation channel for international technol-
ogy transfer. Focusing on the case where costless FDI is the only mode of international technology
transfer, Branstetter and Saggi find that stronger IPR protection results in a lower southern im-
itation rate, a higher northern innovation rate and a higher rate of technology transfer to the
South. These effects are interesting and suggest that stronger IPR protection (TRIPs) may benefit
southern consumers, but Branstetter and Saggi do not provide any welfare analysis.
One paper that does provide welfare analysis is Iwaisako, Tanaka and Futagami (2011). They
present a North-South quality-ladders model without transitional dynamics where innovating north-
ern firms can choose to engage in costless FDI and become multinationals. All technology transfer
occurs through FDI and they study a special case of IPR protection which is patent breadth.
Iwaisako, Tanaka and Futagami show that, as long as the northern labor force is large enough rel-
ative to the southern labor force and innovative R&D is productive enough, consumers in both the
North and the South experience welfare gains from stronger patent protection. Broadening patent
breadth allows multinational firms to charge higher quality-adjusted prices and obtain higher prof-
its, stimulating northern innovation. In this model, imitating firms do not themselves produce in
equilibrium but their presence forces quality leaders to practice limit pricing.
From our perspective, the main drawback of the models by Lai (1998), Branstetter and Saggi
(2011) and Iwaisako, Tanaka and Futagami (2011) is that FDI is costless. In the real world, FDI
is measured in terms of its costs. From 1990 to 2005, the FDI inflow to developing countries
increased from 34.9 to 363.4 billion US dollars (UNCTAD, 2011). We calibrate our model to match
this evidence and it would not be possible to do this using a model with costless FDI.10
Models with costly FDI
Recently, Gustavsson and Segerstrom (2011) have developed two North-South trade models with
costly FDI. In the first model, there is costly innovation, costly FDI and costless imitation. This
model is relatively simple and can be solved analytically. Gustavsson and Segerstrom find that
stronger IPR protection leads to more innovation and more FDI. In the second model, there is
costly innovation, costly FDI and costly imitation. This model is more complicated and is solved
10Also, when we solved our model for the costless FDI special case, we found that this assumption leads to so
much production being transferred from the North to the South that the northern wage rate was only 1.3 percent
higher than the southern wage rate. Explaining large North-South wage differences becomes a problem when FDI is
assumed to be costless.
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numerically but the results are the same for plausible parameter values. Again, they find that
stronger IPR protection leads to more innovation and more FDI.
In an earlier paper, Glass and Saggi (2002) obtained the exact opposite result. They developed
a North-South trade model with costly FDI and found that stronger IPR protection leads to less
innovation and less FDI. However, as Gustavsson and Segerstrom (2011) point out, the Glass-Saggi
result is not robust to allowing for decreasing returns to R&D. The Glass-Saggi result holds when
constant returns to R&D is assumed but ceases to hold when a realistic degree of decreasing returns
to R&D is assumed (see their Table 5). According to the empirical literature, R&D is subject to
significant decreasing returns at the industry level (Kortum, 1993).
In this paper, we build on the analysis in Gustavsson and Segerstrom (2011). As is usual in the
North-South trade literature, they assume that there are no costs to international trade. We extend
their second model by incorporating trade costs. We present a dynamic general equilibrium model
of North-South trade where there are costs of moving production across regions (costly FDI, costly
imitation) and there are also costs of moving goods across regions (costly trade). With this model,
we can study the implications of stronger IPR protection and simultaneous trade liberalization.
Evidence about TRIPs
Empirical support for the view that TRIPs generates dynamic benefits by promoting innovation
and economic growth can be found in Gould and Gruben (1996). They use cross-country data
on patent protection, trade regime and country-specific characteristics and find evidence that IPR
protection is a significant determinant of economic growth. Countries with stronger IPR protection
tend to have higher average yearly per capita GDP growth from 1960 to 1988. Furthermore, the
effects are slightly stronger in relatively open economies. They attribute this to the linkage between
innovation and IPR protection playing a stronger role in more competitive (open) markets. These
results are consistent with our model’s implications (aI ↑⇒ δ ↑, uS0 ↑).
Recently evidence has emerged suggesting that TRIPs also generates other dynamic benefits.
Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2006) study how international technology transfer within US-based
multinational firms changes in response to IPR reforms in developing countries. They find that
due to IPR reform, royalty payments for technology that has been transferred to foreign affiliates
increase and the R&D expenditures of these foreign affiliates increase. In another paper, Branstet-
ter, Fisman, Foley and Saggi (2011) study the response of host country industrial production to
stronger IPR protection. They find that following patent reform aimed at strengthening IPR pro-
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tection, US-based multinational firms expand the scale of their activities in reforming countries
and exports of new goods increase in reforming countries. This evidence suggests that IPR reform
enhances, rather than retards, southern industrial development.
These results provide further empirical support for our model’s implications. In our model,
stronger southern IPR protection leads to a permanent increase in the rate of technology transfer
to the South within multinational firms (aI ↑⇒ φ ↑) and a permanent increase in adaptive R&D
spending in the South by foreign affiliates (aI ↑⇒ LF0 ↑). Whenever technology transfer within
a multinational firm occurs, the foreign affiliate pays its parent firm the royalty payment vNt for
the use of its technology in the South, since the adaptive R&D accounts for the increment in the
firm’s value vFt − vNt which is less than the foreign affiliate’s market value vFt. It follows that
stronger IPR protection leads to more royalty payments as Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2006)
find. Stronger southern IPR protection also leads to more goods being produced in the South
(aI ↑⇒ γF + γI + γC ↑). Thus, our model is consistent with the evidence in Branstetter, Fisman,
Foley and Saggi (2011) that patent reform is associated with an overall expansion of industrial
activity and higher exports of new goods in developing countries.
Empirical support for the view that TRIPs is bad for developing countries can be found in
McCalman (2001). He estimates the value of income transfers between countries implied by the
TRIPs agreement. For each country, the net transfer is defined as the increase in the present value
of patent rights held by residents of the country less the increase in the present value of patent rights
granted by that country. Using data for 29 countries, McCalman finds that only a few countries
gained from TRIPs (United States, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland) and all the
other countries were made worse off, including all developing countries. However, it is important
to note that this analysis is conducted for a given set of innovations, so the benefits of any increase
in innovation in response to the TRIPs agreement are not taken into account. Also the probability
of technology diffusion does not depend on the strength of patent protection, so the benefits of any
increase in FDI in response to the TRIPs agreement are not taken into account. It is just assumed
in McCalman’s empirical estimation that TRIPs does not have any effect on innovation or FDI.
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Appendix 2: Solving The Model
In this appendix, calculations done to solve the model are spelled out in more detail.
Households
The static consumer optimization problem is
max
xt(·)
∫ nt
0
xt(ω)αdω s.t. y˙(ω) = pt(ω)xt(ω), y(0) = 0, y(nt) = ct.
where y(ω) is a new state variable and y˙(ω) is the derivative of y with respect to ω. The Hamiltonian
function for this optimal control problem is
H = xt(ω)α + γ(ω)pt(ω)xt(ω)
where γ(ω) is the costate variable. The costate equation ∂H∂y = 0 = −γ˙(ω) implies that γ(ω) is
constant across ω. ∂H∂x = αxt(ω)
α−1 + γ · pt(ω) = 0 implies that
xt(ω) =
(
α
−γ · pt(ω)
)1/(1−α)
.
Substituting this back into the budget constraint yields
ct =
∫ nt
0
pt(ω)xt(ω)dω =
∫ nt
0
pt(ω)
(
α
−γ · pt(ω)
)1/(1−α)
dω =
(
α
−γ
)1/(1−α) ∫ nt
0
pt(ω)
1−α−1
1−α dω.
Now σ ≡ 11−α implies that 1− σ = 1−α−11−α = −α1−α , so
ct∫ nt
0 pt(ω)
1−σdω
=
(
α
−γ
)1/(1−α)
.
It immediately follows that the consumer demand function is
xt (ω) =
pt (ω)
−σ ct
P 1−σt
(3)
where Pt ≡
[∫ nt
0 pt(ω)
1−σdω
]1/(1−σ) is an index of consumer prices.
Substituting this consumer demand function back into the consumer utility function yields
ut =
 nt∫
0
xt (ω)
α dω
 1α =
 nt∫
0
pt (ω)
−σα cαt
P
(1−σ)α
t
dω
 1α = ct
 nt∫
0
pt (ω)
−σα
P
(1−σ)α
t
dω
 1α .
Taking into account that −σα = −α1−α = 1− σ, consumer utility can be simplified further to
ut =
ct
P 1−σt
 nt∫
0
pt (ω)
1−σ dω
 1α = ct
P 1−σt
[
P 1−σt
] 1
α =
ct
P 1−σt
P−σt =
ct
Pt
44
or
lnut = ln ct − lnPt.
The individual household takes the prices of all products as given, as well as how prices change over
time, so the lnPt term can be ignored in solving the household’s dynamic optimization problem.
This problem simplifies to:
max
ct
∞∫
0
e−(ρ−gL)t ln ct dt s.t. ˙˜at = wt + rta˜t − gLa˜t − ct,
where a˜t represents the asset holding of the representative consumer, wt is the wage rate and rt is
the interest rate.
The Hamiltonian function for this optimal control problem is
H = e−(ρ−gL)t ln ct + λt [wt + rta˜t − gLa˜t − ct]
where λt is the relevant costate variable. The costate equation −λ˙t = ∂H∂a˜ = λt [rt − gL] implies
that
λ˙t
λt
= gL − rt.
∂H/∂ct = e−(ρ−gL)t 1ct − λt = 0 implies that e−(ρ−gL)t 1ct = λt. Taking logs of both sides yields− (ρ− gL) t− ln ct = lnλt and then differentiating with respect to time yields
− (ρ− gL)− c˙t
ct
=
λ˙t
λt
= gL − rt.
It immediately follows that
c˙t
ct
= rt − ρ. (4)
Steady-State Dynamics
We will now derive some steady-state equilibrium implications of the model.
First, we solve for γN . By differentiating the variety condition nt = nNt + nFt + nIt + nCt, we
obtain that
n˙t = n˙Nt + n˙Ft + n˙It + n˙Ct
n˙t
nt
=
n˙Nt
nNt
nNt
nt
+
n˙Ft + n˙It
nNt
nNt
nt
+
n˙Ct
nNt
nNt
nt
g = gγN + φγN + ιNγN
g = (g + φ+ ιN )γN
and solving for γN yields
γN =
g
g + φ+ ιN
. (5)
To solve for γC , note that
ιN = g
γC
γN
= gγC
g + φ+ ιN
g
= γC(g + φ+ ιN ),
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from which it follows that
γC =
ιN
g + φ+ ιN
. (6)
We can also solve for γF and γI . Substituting into γN + γF + γI + γC = 1 yields
g
g + φ+ ιN
+ γF + γI +
ιN
g + φ+ ιN
= 1
or
γF + γI =
φ
g + φ+ ιN
.
Since ιS = gγI/γF implies that γF = gγI/ιS , substituting yields
g
ιS
γI + γI =
(
g + ιS
ιS
)
γI =
φ
g + φ+ ιN
.
It immediately follows that
γI =
(
φ
g + φ+ ιN
)(
ιS
g + ιS
)
and γF =
(
φ
g + φ+ ιN
)(
g
g + ιS
)
. (7)
Because prices differ between the North and the South, we need to define a different price index
for each region. Let PNt be the price index for the North and let PSt be the price index for the
South. Given the earlier definition of the price index Pt ≡
[∫ nt
0 pt(ω)
1−σdω
]1/(1−σ), it follows that
the northern price index satisfies
P 1−σNt =
∫ nt
0
pt(ω)1−σdω
= nNtp1−σN + nFt(p
∗
F )
1−σ + nIt(p∗I)
1−σ + nCt(p∗C)
1−σ
= γNntp1−σN + γFnt(p
∗
F )
1−σ + γInt(p∗I)
1−σ + γCnt(p∗C)
1−σ
=
[
γNp
1−σ
N + γF (p
∗
F )
1−σ + γI(p∗I)
1−σ + γC(p∗C)
1−σ]nt
where the term in brackets is constant over time. Likewise, the southern price index satisfies
P 1−σSt =
∫ nt
0
pt(ω)1−σdω
= nNt(p∗N )
1−σ + nFtp1−σF + nItp
1−σ
I + nCtp
1−σ
C
= γNnt(p∗N )
1−σ + γFntp1−σF + γIntp
1−σ
I + γCntp
1−σ
C
=
[
γN (p∗N )
1−σ + γF p1−σF + γIp
1−σ
I + γCp
1−σ
C
]
nt
where the term in brackets is constant over time. It follows that both P 1−σNt and P
1−σ
St grow over
time at the rate g in any steady-state equilibrium.
Product markets
A northern firm earns the flow of global profits
piNt = (pN − wN )xNtLNt + (p∗N − τwN )x∗NtLSt
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where xNt is the quantity demanded by the typical northern consumer of the northern firm’s product
and x∗Nt is the quantity demanded by the typical southern consumer of the northern firm’s product.
From the earlier demand function, it follows that xNt = p−σN cN/P
1−σ
Nt and x
∗
Nt = (p
∗
N )
−σ cS/P 1−σSt .
Hence, we can write a northern firm’s global profit flow as:
piNt = (pN − wN ) p
−σ
N cNLNt
P 1−σNt
+ (p∗N − τwN )
(p∗N )
−σ cSLSt
P 1−σSt
.
Maximizing piNt with respect to pN yields the first-order condition
∂piNt
∂pN
=
[
(1− σ) p−σN + σwNp−σ−1N
] cNLNt
P 1−σNt
= 0,
which implies that (1− σ) p−σN + σwNp−σ−1N = 0 since we know that cNLNtP 1−σNt 6= 0. Dividing by p
−σ
N
yields σwNpN = σ − 1 or
pN =
σwN
σ − 1 =
wN
α
.
To demonstrate the second equality, first note that σ ≡ 11−α implies that σ − 1 = 1−(1−α)1−α = α1−α .
It follows that σσ−1 = (
1
1−α)/(
α
1−α) =
1
α . Similarly, maximizing piNt with respect to p
∗
N yields the
first-order condition
∂piNt
∂p∗N
=
[
(1− σ) (p∗N )−σ + στwN (p∗N )−σ−1
] cSLSt
P 1−σSt
= 0,
which implies that (1− σ) (p∗N )−σ + στwN (p∗N )−σ−1 = 0. Dividing by (p∗N )−σ yields στwNp∗N = σ− 1
or
p∗N =
στwN
σ − 1 =
τwN
α
.
Plugging the prices back into the profit expression, we obtain
piNt = (pN − wN ) p
−σ
N cNLNt
P 1−σNt
+ (p∗N − τwN )
(p∗N )
−σ cSLSt
P 1−σSt
=
(wN
α
− wN
) p−σN cNLNt
P 1−σNt
+
(τwN
α
− τwN
) (p∗N )−σ cSLSt
P 1−σSt
=
wN
σ − 1
[
p−σN cNLNt
P 1−σNt
+ τ
(p∗N )
−σ cSLSt
P 1−σSt
]
where we have used that 1α − 1 = σσ−1 − σ−1σ−1 = 1σ−1 . It turns out to be convenient to reexpress
profits by multiplying the RHS by LtLt
nNt
nNt
nt
nt
:
piNt =
wN
σ − 1
[
p−σN cNLNtnNt
P 1−σNt Lt
+ τ
(p∗N )
−σ cSLStnNt
P 1−σSt Lt
]
Lt
nt
nNt
nt
.
Now γN ≡ nNtnt is constant over time, XN ≡
p−σN cNLNtnNt
P 1−σNt Lt
is constant over time since P 1−σNt grows at
the same rate g as nNt, and X∗N ≡ (
p∗N)
−σ
cSLStnNt
P 1−σSt Lt
is constant over time since P 1−σSt grows at the
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same rate g as nNt. Thus we can write piNt more simply as:
piNt =
[
wN (XN + τX∗N )
(σ − 1) γN
]
Lt
nt
. (10)
A foreign affiliate earns the flow of global profits:
piFt = (pF − wS)xFtLSt + (p∗F − τwS)x∗FtLNt
where xFt = p−σF cS/P
1−σ
St is the quantity demanded by the typical southern consumer of the foreign
affiliate’s product and x∗Ft = (p
∗
F )
−σ cN/P 1−σNt is the quantity demanded by the typical northern
consumer of the foreign affiliate’s product. Hence, we can write a foreign affiliate’s profit flow as
piFt = (pF − wS) p
−σ
F cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ (p∗F − τwS)
(p∗F )
−σ cNLNt
P 1−σNt
.
Maximizing piFt with respect to pF yields the first-order condition
∂piFt
∂pF
=
[
(1− σ) p−σF + σwSp−σ−1F
] cSLSt
P 1−σSt
= 0
which implies that (1− σ) p−σF + σwSp−σ−1F = 0. Dividing by p−σF yields σwSpF = σ − 1 or
pF =
σwS
σ − 1 =
wS
α
.
Similarly, maximizing piFt with respect to p∗F yields the first-order condition
∂piFt
∂p∗F
=
[
(1− σ) (p∗F )−σ + στwS (p∗F )−σ−1
] cNLNt
P 1−σNt
= 0,
which implies that (1− σ) (p∗F )−σ + στwS (p∗F )−σ−1 = 0. Dividing by (p∗F )−σ yields στwSp∗F = σ − 1
or
p∗F =
στwS
σ − 1 =
τwS
α
.
We assume that τwS < wN so each foreign affiliate exports to the northern market. The trade costs
parameter τ cannot be too high. Plugging the prices back into the profit expression, we obtain
piFt =
(wS
α
− wS
) p−σF cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+
(τwS
α
− τwS
) (p∗F )−σcNLNt
P 1−σNt
=
wS
σ − 1
[
p−σF cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ τ
(p∗F )
−σ cNLNt
P 1−σNt
]
.
We reexpress profits by multiplying the RHS by LtLt
nFt
nFt
nt
nt
:
piFt =
wS
σ − 1
[
p−σF cSLStnFt
P 1−σSt Lt
+ τ
(p∗F )
−σ cNLNtnFt
P 1−σNt Lt
]
Lt
nt
nFt
nt
.
Now γF ≡ nFtnt is constant over time, XF ≡
p−σF cSLStnFt
P 1−σSt Lt
is constant over time since P 1−σSt grows at
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the same rate g as nFt, and X∗F ≡ (
p∗F )
−σ
cNLNtnFt
P 1−σNt Lt
is constant over time since P 1−σNt grows at the
same rate g as nFt. Thus we can write piFt more simply as:
piFt =
[
wS (XF + τX∗F )
(σ − 1) γF
]
Lt
nt
. (11)
After a product variety that a foreign affiliate produces is imitated by a southern firm (an
“I-firm”, where “I” stands for Imitating), the southern firm earns the flow of global profits
piIt = (pI − ζwS)xItLSt + (p∗I − τζwS)x∗ItLNt
where xIt = p−σI cS/P
1−σ
St is the quantity demanded by the typical southern consumer of the I-firm’s
product and x∗It = (p
∗
I)
−σ cN/P 1−σNt is the quantity demanded by the typical northern consumer of
the I-firm’s product. Thus,
piIt = (pI − ζwS)p
−σ
I cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ (p∗I − τζwS)
(p∗I)
−σ cNLNt
P 1−σNt
.
Maximizing piIt with respect to pI yields the first-order condition
∂piIt
∂pI
=
[
(1− σ) p−σI + σζwSp−σ−1I
] cSLSt
P 1−σSt
= 0,
which implies that (1− σ) p−σI + σζwSp−σ−1I = 0. Dividing by p−σI yields σζwSpI = σ − 1 or
pI = σζwSσ−1 =
ζwS
α . This is the monopoly price that the southern firm would charge if it had
no competitors. We assume that ζ > α, so ζwSα exceeds the marginal cost of the foreign affiliate
wS . Then the limit price
pI = wS
is less than the monopoly price and it is profit-maximizing for the southern firm to practice limit
pricing in its domestic market. (Once the product is imitated, the imitator is in competition with
the foreign affiliate. The foreign affiliate cannot lower its price below its marginal cost wS . At
pI = wS the imitator still makes positive profits but drives the foreign affiliate out of business.)
Maximizing piIt with respect to p∗I yields the other first-order condition:
∂piIt
∂p∗I
=
[
(1− σ) (p∗I)−σ + στζwS (p∗I)−σ−1
] cNLNt
P 1−σNt
= 0,
which implies that (1− σ) (p∗I)−σ + στζwS (p∗I)−σ−1 = 0. Dividing by (p∗I)−σ yields στζwSp∗I = σ − 1
or p∗I =
στζwS
σ−1 =
τζwS
α . This is the monopoly price that the southern firm would charge in the
export market if it had no competitors. But it is competing against the foreign affiliate whose
product it has imitated. Since τζwSα exceeds the marginal cost of the foreign affiliate τwS , it is
profit-maximizing for the southern firm to set the limit price
p∗I = τwS
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in its export market. Plugging the limit prices back into the profit expression, we obtain
piIt = (wS − ζwS) p
−σ
I cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ (τwS − τζwS) p
∗
IcNLNt
P 1−σNt
= wS (1− ζ)
[
p−σI cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ τ
(p∗I)
−σ cNLNt
P 1−σNt
]
= wS (1− ζ)
[
p−σI cSLStnIt
P 1−σSt Lt
+ τ
(p∗I)
−σ cNLNtnIt
P 1−σNt Lt
]
Lt
nt
nIt
nt
.
Now γI ≡ nItnt is constant over time, XI ≡
p−σI cSLStnIt
P 1−σSt Lt
is constant over time since P 1−σSt grows at
the same rate g as nIt, and X∗I ≡ (
p∗I)
−σ
cNLNtnIt
P 1−σNt Lt
is constant over time since P 1−σNt grows at the
same rate g as nIt. Thus we can write piIt more simply as:
piIt =
[
wS (1− ζ) (XI +X∗I )
γI
]
Lt
nt
. (12)
After a variety that a northern firm produces is imitated by a southern firm (a “C-firm”, where
“C” stands for Copying), the southern firm earns the flow of global profits
piCt = (pC − ζwS)xCtLSt + (p∗C − τζwS)x∗CtLNt
where xCt = p−σC cS/P
1−σ
St is the quantity demanded by the typical southern consumer of the C-
firm’s product, and x∗Ct = (p
∗
C)
−σ cN/P 1−σNt is the quantity demanded by the typical northern
consumer of the C-firm’s product. We write the C-firm’s profit flow as
piCt = (pC − ζwS)p
−σ
C cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ (p∗C − τζwS)
(p∗C)
−σ cNLNt
P 1−σNt
.
Maximizing piCt with respect to pC yields the first-order condition
∂piCt
∂pC
=
[
(1− σ) p−σC + σζwSp−σ−1C
] cSLSt
P 1−σSt
= 0,
which implies that (1− σ) p−σC + σζwSp−σ−1C = 0. Dividing by p−σC yields σζwSpC = σ − 1, and
rearranging gives the monopoly price
pC =
σζwS
σ − 1 =
ζwS
α
.
But the southern firm faces a competitor in the northern firm whose product it has imitated. We
restrict attention to the steady-state equilibrium where τwN > ζwSα or τ
wN
wS
> ζα to guarantee that
the southern firm charges the monopoly price pC = ζwS/α in its domestic market. Maximizing piCt
with respect to p∗C yields the first-order condition
∂piCt
∂p∗C
=
[
(1− σ) (p∗C)−σ + στζwS (p∗C)−σ−1
] cNLNt
P 1−σNt
= 0,
which implies that (1− σ) (p∗C)−σ + στζwS (p∗C)−σ−1 = 0. Dividing by (p∗C)−σ yields στζwS/p∗C =
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σ−1 and rearranging gives the monopoly export price p∗C = στζwSσ−1 = τζwSα . But southern firm faces
a competitor in the northern firm whose product it has imitated. There are two cases to consider,
depending on whether trade costs are small or large. If wN ≥ τζwSα or wNwS ≥
τζ
α (the small trade
cost case), then the northern firm has too high marginal cost wN to effectively compete in the
northern market and the southern firm sets the monopoly export price in equilibrium:
p∗C =
τζwS
α
if
wN
wS
≥ τζ
α
.
If wN < τζwSα or
wN
wS
< τζα (the large trade cost case), then the northern firm has low enough
marginal cost wN so its presence needs to be taken into account and the southern firm sets the
limit price in equilibrium:
p∗C = wN if
wN
wS
<
τζ
α
.
In the small trade cost case,
piCt = (pC − ζwS)p
−σ
C cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ (p∗C − τζwS)
(p∗C)
−σ cNLNt
P 1−σNt
=
(
ζwS
α
− ζwS
)
p−σC cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+
(
τζwS
α
− τζwS
)
(p∗C)
−σ cNLNt
P 1−σNt
=
ζwS
σ − 1
[
p−σC cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ τ
(p∗C)
−σ cNLNt
P 1−σNt
]
=
ζwS
σ − 1
[
p−σC cSLStnCt
P 1−σSt Lt
+ τ
(p∗C)
−σ cNLNtnCt
P 1−σNt Lt
]
Lt
nt
nCt
nt
.
Since XC ≡ p
−σ
C cSLStnCt
P 1−σSt Lt
, X∗C ≡ (
p∗C)
−σ
cNLNtnCt
P 1−σNt Lt
and γC ≡ nCtnt are all constant over time in steady-
state equilibrium, the profit flow for a C-firm is:
piCt =
[
ζwS (XC + τX∗C)
(σ − 1) γC
]
Lt
nt
if
wN
wS
≥ τζ
α
. (13)
In the large trade cost case,
piCt = (pC − ζwS)p
−σ
C cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ (p∗C − τζwS)
(p∗C)
−σ cNLNt
P 1−σNt
=
(
ζwS
α
− ζwS
)
p−σC cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ (wN − τζwS) (p
∗
C)
−σ cNLNt
P 1−σNt
=
ζwS
σ − 1
p−σC cSLSt
P 1−σSt
+ (wN − τζwS) (p
∗
C)
−σ cNLNt
P 1−σNt
=
[
ζwS
σ − 1
p−σC cSLStnCt
P 1−σSt Lt
+ (wN − τζwS) (p
∗
C)
−σ cNLNtnCt
P 1−σNt Lt
]
Lt
nt
nCt
nt
.
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and it follows that the profit flow for a C-firm is:
piCt =
[
ζwSXC
(σ − 1) γC +
(wN − τζwS)X∗C
γC
]
Lt
nt
if
wN
wS
<
τζ
α
. (14)
Innovation, FDI and Imitation
Given the innovative R&D technology, the aggregate flow of new products developed in the North
is
n˙t =
nθtLRt
aNgβ
where LRt ≡
∑
i lRit is the total amount of northern labor employed in innovative activities. Sub-
stituting for g ≡ n˙tnt , we obtain
n˙t =
nθtLRt
aN (n˙t)β/(nt)β
(n˙t)1+β =
nθ+βt LRt
aN
n˙t =
[
nθ+βt LRt
aN
]1/(1+β)
.
R&D Incentives
For a northern firm, the relevant no-arbitrage condition is
vNt =
piNt
ρ+ θg + ιN
=
wNaNg
β
nθt
.
Substituting for piNt yields
wN(XN+τX∗N)
(σ−1)γN
Lt
nt
ρ+ θg + ιN
=
wNaNg
β
nθt
XN+τX
∗
N
(σ−1)γN
ρ+ θg + ιN
= aN
n1−θt
Lt
gβ.
Thus the steady-state northern no-arbitrage condition is
XN+τX
∗
N
(σ−1)γN
ρ+ θg + ιN
= aNδgβ. (26)
For a foreign affiliate, the relevant no-arbitrage condition is
vFt − vNt = piFt
ρ+ θg + ιS
− wNaNg
β
nθt
=
wSaFφ
β
nθt
.
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Using the foreign affiliate profits from earlier, we can write this as:
wS(XF+τX∗F )
(σ−1)γF
Lt
nt
ρ+ θg + ιS
− wNaNg
β
nθt
=
wSaFφ
β
nθt
XF+τX
∗
F
(σ−1)γF
ρ+ θg + ιS
− wN
wS
aN
n1−θt
Lt
gβ = aF
n1−θt
Lt
φβ.
It follows that the steady-state foreign affiliate no-arbitrage condition is
XF+τX
∗
F
(σ−1)γF
ρ+ θg + ιS
− waNδgβ = aF δφβ (27)
where w ≡ wNwS is the northern relative wage.
For a southern firm imitating a foreign affiliate variety, the relevant no-arbitrage condition is
vIt =
piIt
ρ+ θg
=
wSaIι
β
S
nθt
.
Using the southern firm profits from earlier, we can write this as:
wS(1−ζ)(XI+τX∗I )
γI
Lt
nt
ρ+ θg
=
wSaIι
β
S
nθt
(1−ζ)(XI+τX∗I )
γI
ρ+ θg
= aI
n1−θt
Lt
ιβS .
It follows that the steady-state I-firm no-arbitrage condition is
(1−ζ)(XI+τX∗I )
γI
ρ+ θg
= aIδι
β
S . (28)
For a southern firm imitating a northern variety, the relevant no-arbitrage condition is
vCt =
piCt
ρ+ θg
=
wSdaIι
β
N
nθt
.
In the small trade cost case,
piCt
ρ+ θg
=
wSdaIι
β
N
nθt
ζwS(XC+τX∗C)
(σ−1)γC
Lt
nt
ρ+ θg
=
wSdaIι
β
N
nθt
ζ(XC+τX∗C)
(σ−1)γC
ρ+ θg
= daI
n1−θt
Lt
ιβN .
53
It follows that the steady-state C-firm no-arbitrage condition is
ζ(XC+τX∗C)
(σ−1)γC
ρ+ θg
= daIδι
β
N if
wN
wS
≥ τζ
α
. (29a)
In the large trade cost case,
piCt
ρ+ θg
=
wSdaIι
β
N
nθt[
ζwSXC
(σ−1)γC +
(wN−τζwS)X∗C
γC
]
Lt
nt
ρ+ θg
=
wSdaIι
β
N
nθt
ζXC
(σ−1)γC +
(w−τζ)X∗C
γC
ρ+ θg
= daI
n1−θt
Lt
ιβN .
It follows that the steady-state C-firm no-arbitrage condition is
ζXC
(σ−1)γC +
(w−τζ)X∗C
γC
ρ+ θg
= daIδι
β
N if
wN
wS
<
τζ
α
. (29b)
Labor Markets
Full employment of labor in the South implies that
LSt =
aFφ
β
nθt
(n˙Ft + n˙It)+
aIι
β
S
nθt
n˙It+
daIι
β
N
nθt
n˙Ct+(XF + τX∗F )Lt+ζ (XI + τX
∗
I )Lt+ζ (XC + τX
∗
C)Lt.
Now, using δ ≡ n1−θtLt , ιN ≡
n˙Ct
nNt
, φ ≡ n˙Ft+n˙ItnNt and ιS ≡
n˙It
nFt
, southern R&D employment can be
written as
=
aFφ
β
nθt
(n˙Ft + n˙It) +
aIι
β
S
nθt
n˙It +
daIι
β
N
nθt
n˙Ct
=
aFφ
β (n˙Ft + n˙It)
nNt
nNt
nt
n1−θt
Lt
Lt + aIι
β
S
n˙It
nFt
nFt
nt
n1−θt
Lt
Lt + daIι
β
N
n˙Ct
nNt
nNt
nt
n1−θt
Lt
Lt
= aFφ1+βγNδLt + aIι
1+β
S γF δLt + daIι
1+β
N γNδLt.
It follows that
LSt =
[(
aFφ
1+βγN + aIι
1+β
S γF + daIι
1+β
N γN
)
δ +XF + τX∗F + ζ (XI + τX
∗
I +XC + τX
∗
C)
]
Lt
and evaluating at t = 0 yields the steady-state full employment of southern labor condition:
LS0 =
(
aFφ
1+βγN + aIι
1+β
S γF + daIι
1+β
N γN
)
δL0
+ [XF + τX∗F + ζ (XI + τX
∗
I +XC + τX
∗
C)]L0. (31)
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Aggregate demand
We need to solve for steady-state values of the aggregate demand expressions XN , X∗N , XI , X
∗
I ,
XC and X∗C . The calculations
XN
X∗F
=
p−σN cNLNtnNt
P 1−σNt Lt
(p∗F )
−σ
cNLNtnFt
P 1−σNt Lt
=
(
pN
p∗F
)−σ nNt/nt
nFt/nt
=
( wN
α
τwS
α
)−σ
γN
γF
=
( τ
w
)σ gg+φ+ιN
φ
g+φ+ιN
g
g+ιS
=
( τ
w
)σ g + ιS
φ
X∗N
XF
=
(p∗N)
−σ
cSLStnNt
P 1−σSt Lt
p−σF cSLStnFt
P 1−σSt Lt
=
(
p∗N
pF
)−σ nNt/nt
nFt/nt
=
( τwN
α
wS
α
)−σ
γN
γF
=
(
1
τw
)σ g
g+φ+ιN
φ
g+φ+ιN
g
g+ιS
=
(
1
τw
)σ g + ιS
φ
XI
XF
=
p−σI cSLStnIt
P 1−σSt Lt
p−σF cSLStnFt
P 1−σSt Lt
=
(
pI
pF
)−σ nIt/nt
nFt/nt
=
(
wS
wS
α
)−σ γI
γF
=
(
1
α
)σ φ
g+φ+ιN
ιS
g+ιS
φ
g+φ+ιN
g
g+ιS
=
(
1
α
)σ ιS
g
X∗I
X∗F
=
(p∗I)
−σ
cNLNtnIt
P 1−σNt Lt
(p∗F )
−σ
cNLNtnFt
P 1−σNt Lt
=
(
p∗I
p∗F
)−σ nIt/nt
nFt/nt
=
(
τwS
τwS
α
)−σ γI
γF
=
(
1
α
)σ φ
g+φ+ιN
ιS
g+ιS
φ
g+φ+ιN
g
g+ιS
=
(
1
α
)σ ιS
g
XC
XF
=
p−σC cSLStnCt
P 1−σSt Lt
p−σF cSLStnFt
P 1−σSt Lt
=
(
pC
pF
)−σ nCt/nt
nFt/nt
=
(
ζwS
α
wS
α
)−σ
γC
γF
=
(
1
ζ
)σ ιN
g+φ+ιN
φ
g+φ+ιN
g
g+ιS
=
(
1
ζ
)σ (g + ιS) ιN
φg
imply that
XN = X∗F
( τ
w
)σ g + ιS
φ
X∗N = XF
(
1
τw
)σ g + ιS
φ
XI = XF
(
1
α
)σ ιS
g
X∗I = X
∗
F
(
1
α
)σ ιS
g
XC = XF
(
1
ζ
)σ (g + ιS) ιN
φg
.
In the small trade cost case (wNwS ≥
τζ
α ),
X∗C
X∗F
=
(p∗C)
−σ
cNLNtnCt
P 1−σNt Lt
(p∗F )
−σ
cNLNtnFt
P 1−σNt Lt
=
(
p∗C
p∗F
)−σ nCt
nt
nFt
nt
=
(
τζwS
α
τwS
α
)−σ
γC
γF
=
(
1
ζ
)σ ιN
g+φ+ιN
φ
g+φ+ιN
g
g+ιS
=
(
1
ζ
)σ (g + ιS) ιN
φg
.
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In the large trade cost case (wNwS <
τζ
α ),
X∗C
X∗F
=
(
p∗C
p∗F
)−σ nCt/nt
nFt/nt
=
(
wN
τwS
α
)−σ γC
γF
=
( τ
αw
)σ (g + ιS) ιN
φg
.
Thus
X∗C = X
∗
F
(
1
ζ
)σ (g + ιS) ιN
φg
if
wN
wS
≥ τζ
α
and
X∗C = X
∗
F
( τ
αw
)σ (g + ιS) ιN
φg
if
wN
wS
<
τζ
α
.
Consumer Expenditure and Asset Ownership
The aggregate value of all financial assets is the total value of firms:
At = ANt +ASt = nNtvNt + nFtvFt + nItvIt + nCtvCt.
The aggregate value of southern financial assets ASt is given by
ASt = nFt (vFt − vNt) + nItvIt + nCtvCt
= nFt
wSaFφ
β
nθt
+ nIt
wSaIι
β
S
nθt
+ nCt
wSdaIι
β
N
nθt
= wS
nt
nθtLt
Lt
nFt
nt
aFφ
β + wS
nt
nθtLt
Lt
nIt
nt
aIι
β
S + wS
nt
nθtLt
Lt
nCt
Nt
daIι
β
N
= wSδLtγFaFφβ + wSδLtγIaIι
β
S + wSδLtγCdaIι
β
N
= wSδLt
[
γFaFφ
β + γIaIι
β
S + γCdaIι
β
N
]
.
The aggregate value of northern financial assets ANt is given by
ANt = At −ASt
= [nNtvNt + nFtvFt + nItvIt + nCtvCt]− [nFt (vFt − vNt) + nItvIt + nCtvCt]
= nNtvNt + nFtvNt
= (nNt + nFt) vNt
= (γNnt + γFnt)
wNaNg
βLt
nθtLt
= wNLt (γN + γF ) aN
nt
nθtLt
gβ
= wNLt (γN + γF ) aNδgβ.
Northern consumer expenditure cN is given by
cN = wN + (ρ− gL) a˜Nt
= w + (ρ− gL) ANt
LNt
= w + (ρ− gL) wNLt (γN + γF ) aNδg
β
LNt
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cN = w
[
1 + (ρ− gL) (γN + γF ) aNδgβ L0
LN0
]
. (32)
Likewise, southern consumer expenditure cS is given by
cS = wS + (ρ− gL) a˜St
= 1 + (ρ− gL) ASt
LSt
= 1 + (ρ− gL)
wSδLt
[
γFaFφ
β + γIaIι
β
S + γCdaIι
β
N
]
LSt
cS = 1 + (ρ− gL) δ
[
γFaFφ
β + γIaIι
β
S + γCdaIι
β
N
] L0
LS0
. (33)
Having solved for consumer expenditures cN and cS , we can determine the relationship between
XF and X∗F :
X∗F
XF
=
(p∗F )
−σ
cNLNtnFt
P 1−σNt Lt
p−σF cSLStnFt
P 1−σSt Lt
=
(
pF
p∗F
)σ cN
cS
LN0
LS0
P 1−σSt
P 1−σNt
=
(
1
α
τ
α
)σ
cN
cS
LN0
LS0
P 1−σSt
P 1−σNt
and simplifying yields the steady-state asset condition
X∗F
XF
=
(
1
τ
)σ cN
cS
LN0
LS0
P 1−σSt
P 1−σNt
, (34)
where
P 1−σSt
P 1−σNt
=
(
γN (p∗N )
1−σ + γF p1−σF + γIp
1−σ
I + γCp
1−σ
C
)
nt(
γNp
1−σ
N + γF
(
p∗F
)1−σ + γI (p∗I)1−σ + γC (p∗C)1−σ)nt
=
γN (p∗N )
1−σ + γF p1−σF + γIp
1−σ
I + γCp
1−σ
C
γNp
1−σ
N + γF
(
p∗F
)1−σ + γI (p∗I)1−σ + γC (p∗C)1−σ .
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